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No. 20090252-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN M. DURAN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, ET AL., 
Respondents. 
DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY SERVICES'S 
ANSWER BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from John M. Duran's grievance filed with the 
Career Service Review Board (CSRB). On March 4, 2009, the CSRB upheld 
the Utah Department of Technology Services's (DTS) decision to terminate 
Duran's employment. R. 000639-668. (Decision and Final Agency Action, 
attached as addendum A). Duran timely filed a petition for review with this 
Court on March 30, 2009. This Court has jurisdiction to review CSRB 
decisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West Supp. 2009) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-40KD (West Supp. 2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. T h e CSRB's d e c i s i o n 
The CSRB must affirm an agency's decision to terminate employment 
if the decision has factual support and is within the bounds of reasonableness. 
Here, substantial evidence supports the findings tha t Duran violated agency 
rules and policies regarding appropriate t reatment of co-workers. Duran 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those findings. Did the CSRB 
correctly affirm DTS's decision to terminate Duran's employment? 
A, Standard of Review: 
This issue involves a mixed question of law and fact tha t the Court 
reviews deferentially to determine whether the CSRB decision was 
reasonable and rational. Sorge v. Office of the Attorney General, 2006 UT 
App. 2 , 1 17,128 P.3d 566. 
B. Preservat ion of Issue: 
The CSRB issued its Decision and Final Agency Action on March 4, 
2009. R. 000639-668. Duran filed a petition for review with this Court on 
March 30, 2009. 
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II. Admission of the 2003 Corrective Action Plan 
A decision to admit or exclude evidence constitutes reversible error only 
when the likelihood of a different outcome is high enough to undermine 
confidence in the final result. Here, the CRSB admitted Duran's 2003 
corrective action plan (CAP) into evidence as part of his documented work 
history, but also noted that the CAP had "little or nd bearing" on the 
CSRB's final decision. Did the CRSB commit reversible error by admitting 
the CAP? 
A. Standard of Review: 
This issue raises a question of general law that the Court reviews "for 
correctness, granting no deference to [the CSRB's] decision." Holland v. 
Career Serv. Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Preservation of Issue: 
Duran moved to exclude the CAP prior to the Step 5 hearing. R. 
000184-188. DTS responded, R. 000217-226, and the Hearing Officer ruled 
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that the CAP was admissible. R. 000247-253; 669 pp. 252-260. The CSRB 
also reviewed the issue at Step 6. R. 000658-659. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statues and rules are included in the body of this 
brief. And relevant DHRM and DTS rules and policies are attached as 
addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
DTS terminated Duran's employment, and Duran grieved his 
dismissal to the CSRB. After a hearing at Step 5, the Hearing Officer upheld 
DTS's decision. Duran appealed to Step 6, and the CSRB upheld the 
decision. The CSRB held that substantial evidence supported DTS's 
decision to end Duran's state employment and that termination was neither 
excessive nor disproportionate. 
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Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
DTS terminated Duran's employment as a Technical Support 
Specialist II. R. 000672 Ex. A-14. DTS dismissed Duran for violating various 
department rules and policies, as well as the Employee Code of Conduct. R. 
000672 Ex. A-15 & A-28. 
Duran timely grieved his termination to the CSRB. R. 000001-6. 
Subsequently, CSRB Administrative Law Judge, Katherine A. Fox, conducted 
a Step 5 evidentiary hearing. R. 000669-670. In her Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decision, the Hearing Officer upheld DTS's decision. 
R. 000254-297. (attached as addendum B). The Hearing Officer also found 
that the termination of Duran's employment was not excessive, 
disproportionate, or otherwise an abuse of discretion. R. 000287. 
Later, Duran filed his notice of appeal to the CSRB. R. 000306-309. 
After hearing Duran's appeal, the CSRB issued its Decision and Final 
Agency Action. The CSRB affirmed, concluding that the Hearing Officer's 
decision was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence. R. 
000660-661. The CSRB found that the Hearing Officer correctly applied all 
relevant policies and rules in rendering her decision. The CSRB also found 
that DTS's decision to terminate Duran's employment was based upon just 
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cause and to advance the good of the public service. R. 000660-661. Duran 
timely filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Duran worked for DTS for approximately two years.1 R. 000669 pp. 
189-190, 242-243. Duran performed computer service work for the 
Department of Workforce Services (DWS) in DWS's Woods Cross office. R. 
000670 pp. 437-439. Duran was the only computer service worker for the 
office. R. 000670 p. 439. Beginning in April 2004, Duran began a prolonged 
and documented pattern of disrespectful, offensive, and unprofessional 
conduct toward certain female co-workers. R. 000672 Ex. A-12. 
Interaction with JoAnna Gomberg 
Shortly after JoAnna Gomberg started working for DWS in 2004, 
Duran began asking her to go to lunch or out for coffee and doughnuts. R. 
000669 pp. 51-53. Gomberg tried to discourage the invitations, but they 
1
 Duran was originally hired in 2000 by the Utah Department of 
Workforce Services as a Technology Specialist. R. 000669 p. 244; 670 p. 437. 
By legislative action in 2005, Duran's position, as well as all other 
technology services' positions within the State, moved to a new department 
titled the Utah Department of Technology Services. R. 000669 pp. 242-243. 
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continued. R. 000669 pp. 52-53. Finally, she told Duran that she would not 
go to lunch with him ever. R. 000669 p. 52. But, despite that strong 
statement, the invitations never stopped. R 000669 pp. 52-53. 
Duran gave Gomberg "up and down" stares, (it. 000669 pp. 42-43) and 
commented that, "You really dress good," and that he "liked a girl with a 
little meat on her." R. 000669 p. 43. Then Duran started to ask Gomberg 
personal questions about her boyfriend's appearance - did he resemble 
Duran - and asked whether she cheated on him. R. 000669 pp. 45-46; 672 Ex. 
A-l. 
When Duran learned that Gomberg was living with her boyfriend, he 
started asking her questions about physical intimacy. He asked if "she had 
been with a lot of guys," and commented that "I'll bet you've had a lot of 
boyfriends." He would ask, "How are things going with your man?" R. 
000669 pp. 46, 48-49. And admitted that this was the "type of tactic" he 
used to "move in with women." R. 000669 p. 87. This conduct culminated in 
Duran remarking that because Gomberg lived in the Avenues, it would be 
easy for the neighbors to see when Gomberg and her boyfriend "were getting 
romantic." R. 000669 p. 49. 
After a period of flat refusal to answer his personal questions, Gomberg 
repeatedly told Duran that his comments made her uncomfortable and were 
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offensive. R. 000669 pp. 44-45. Despite that, Duran still asked personal 
questions and made inappropriate remarks on an intermittent basis. R. 
000669 pp. 44-45. 
In 2006, Duran showed Gomberg a new "spy camera" he had for 
private investigator work. R. 000669 pp. 33-34. He told her that he attached 
a GPS device to a friend's wife's car to track her. R. 000669 pp. 32-33. 
Then he asked if he could set the camera up at Gomberg's house. R. 000669 
pp. 33-34. Gomberg told Duran, "That's creepy, I'm leaving." R. 000669 p. 
34. He responded, "What, do you get shy in front of a camera?" R. 000669 p. 
34. 
The spy camera episode troubled Gomberg so much that she spoke with 
her father about it, and based on his recommendation, decided to put her 
objections to Duran's conduct in writing. R. 000669 p. 93. But before she 
wrote the letter, Gomberg told Duran what she planned to do. R. 000669 p. 
38. When Gomberg told Duran about her plans, he became agitated. 
R.000669 pp. 38-39. He told her that she should not send him the letter 
because if she did: 1) a copy would be put in her personnel file and it would 
follow her for the rest of her career; 2) Duran would retaliate and file a false 
racial discrimination complaint against her; and 3) everyone in the office, 
including management, would think that she and Duran had a sexual 
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relationship. R. 000669 pp. 39-41. Gomberg was so upset and threatened by 
this conversation that she went outside the office and started to cry because 
she was "just so scared and overwhelmed." R. 000669 p. 41. Gomberg 
reported this conversation to her supervisors. R. 000669 p. 41. 
On August 28, 2006, Gomberg sent Duran an email that objected to 
various topics Duran repeatedly introduced into their conversations. R. 
000672 Ex. A-1. She asked Duran to keep their interactions "focus [ed] on 
professional issues." R. 00672 Ex. A-1. It also stated that, while the list was 
not inclusive, she wanted to avoid any future discussions relating to: "1) my 
physical appearance, the way I dress, and my body type; 2) my relationship 
with my boyfriend; 3) my current or past level of physical intimacy with 
anyone; and 4) other women whom you find attractive" R. 000672 Ex. A-1. 
Even after she sent the e-mail, when Duran wa^ in Gomberg's office, 
he talked about women in the office, some married, with whom he had 
presumably slept. He added that, '"You know they think we slept together." 
R. 000669 pp. 55-56. 
Gomberg's experiences with Duran made her reluctant to ask him for 
computer help.2 She "didn't want to interact with him at all, for any 
2In his Brief, Duran incorrectly notes that after Gomberg's e-mail to 
Duran, she was comfortable enough with Duran to give him a ride. Aplt's 
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reason, even my computer, even though that was sort of [a] prescribed 
relationship." R. 000669 pp. 75-76. 
Interaction with Monica Hulbert 
In November 2006, Hulbert started working for DWS. During her first 
week, Duran started asking her personal questions - "not stuff I discuss with 
people I don't know"- including questions about what she did on the 
weekends, the identity of her child's father, did she drink alcohol, did she 
party, and did she go to clubs. R. 000669 pp. 111-113. 
Next, Duran started asking Hulbert to go to lunch. R. 000669 p. 114. 
She consistently refused. He then started asking her to go to coffee or dinner. 
R. 000669 pp. 115-116. Hulbert told Duran that she was not interested in 
going out with him. R. 000669 p. 116. 
In early 2007, Duran complained to Hulbert that his leg or foot hurt 
and asked, "Do you want to massage it?" When Hulbert said "no," Duran 
persisted with "Oh, come on." Hulbert was near her cubicle and started to 
walk away to the break room. Duran followed her and continued the 
Brief at p. 28. But Gomberg's testimony shows that she gave Duran a ride 
before the e-mail, and that even though she did drive him, she did not want 
to. R. 000669 pp. 35-36. 
-10-
conversation in front of another co-worker, Renee Johnson, who also walked 
into the break room. R. 000669 pp. 118-121. Hulbert was offended by the 
massage incident, and told Gomberg about it. R. 000669 pp. 121-122. They 
talked about ways Hulbert could discourage Duran from making similar 
remarks. R. 000669 pp. 121-122. 
Duran also talked about cheating on his wife. And he asked Hulbert if 
she thought it was wrong for Duran to go out with an old female friend. R. 
000669 pp. 122-125. The conversations made Hulbert uncomfortable. R. 
000669 p. 122-123. 
Another time, after the usual invitation and decline, Duran saw 
Hulbert with another co-worker, Jeff De Juncker. Duran commented that, 
"Oh, you'll go to his car with him, but you won't go out with me." R. 
000669 p. 142. The comment embarrassed Hulbert, and she felt compelled to 
explain the situation to De Juncker. R. 000669 p. 144. And finally, in early 
2007, Hulbert started asking others in the office, like De Juncker, for 
computer help, in order to avoid Duran. R. 000669 pp. 122-124. 
Interaction with Lindsay Nielson 
Nielson started working for DWS in June 2006. R. 000669 p. 155. On 
her first day of work, Duran ogled her. R. 000669 p. 154. Within her first 
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week of work, Duran started to ask to drive her car on "a persistent daily 
basis/' R. 000669 pp. 155-156. Then the invitations to lunch started. R. 
000669 pp. 155-158. Nielson consistently refused the invitations, indicating 
that she was married and had no intentions of going to lunch or anywhere 
with Duran. R. 000669 p. 161. 
Duran consistently tried to flirt with Nielson and told her she looked 
like a "certain model." The comments offended her, and she did not consider 
them compliments. R. 000669 p. 158. The comments and lunch invitations 
continued throughout 2007. R. 000669 pp. 158-161. Nielson told Duran that 
the comments made her uncomfortable and asked him to stop. R. 000669 
158-161. 
One day, Nielson wore a short "shrug" sweater over a long white shirt. 
Nielson and Duran were alone in the break room, and Duran poked her in 
the middle of the back where the sweater ended and asked her if she 
purchased the sweater "in the Barbie doll section." Duran then poked 
Nielson in her back and said "see, it doesn't even come down to there." R. 
000669 pp. 162-163. Duran referred to Nielson's clothing as "Barbie doll 
sized" on more than one previous occasion, but this time Nielson was 
"shocked" to the point of being "speechless" that Duran touched her. R. 
000669 pp. 163, 168. 
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Nielson understood that if she objected or was not receptive to Duran's 
unwanted attention, Duran would stall fixing her computer. R. 000669 pp. 
164-165. She feared that, if she confronted Duran, he would not fix her 
computer in a timely manner. R. 000669 pp. 164-165. She noted that Duran 
was slow to respond after each "uncomfortable conversation" or unpleasant 
encounter. R. 000669 pp. 164-165. Nielson was so uncomfortable around 
Duran that she tried to fix her own computer problems or asked others for 
assistance before resorting to Duran for help. 
DTS's Response 
Duran's immediate supervisor learned about Gomberg's e-mail after 
the spy camera incident and passed the information to human resources. R. 
000669 pp. 206-211. Human Resources started an investigation. R. 000669 
p. 211. After the investigation, Jim Matsumura wrote an Intent to Dismiss 
letter that recommended to DTS's Executive Director that Duran's 
employment be terminated. R. 000669 p. 288. The letter summarized the 
allegations raised in the investigation showing Duran's "pattern of 
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inappropriate behavior" and "unlawful and work place harassment of four 
DWS female employees." R. 000672 Ex. A-13.3 
The Intent to Dismiss letter cited relevant human resource and DTS 
policies and rules and informed Duran that DTS was firing him for violating 
those rules and for failing to "maintain agency professional standards, 
failing to advance the good of the public service, and for just cause/' R. 
000672 Ex. A-13. 
On July 9, 2007, DTS's Executive Director held a Step 4 pre-
termination hearing. R. 000670 pp. 349-350. And on July 10, 2007, Director 
Fletcher issued the Final Decision - Dismissal for Cause (Final Decision). R. 
000672 Ex. A-14. Thereafter, on July 11, 2007, Duran filed grieved his 
termination to the CSRB. R. 000001-6. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The CSRB correctly upheld DTS's decision to terminate Duran's 
employment. Duran failed to marshal the evidence in support of the CSRB's 
factual findings and cannot challenge them here. 
3
 Only Gomberg, Hulbert, and Nielson testified at the Step 5 hearing, 
and the Hearing Officer did not consider any allegations by the employee who 
did not testify. R. 000259 f 18. 
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But even if this Court were to ignore every fact that Duran challenges, 
his conduct toward a co-worker who told him she was going to put her 
concerns about him in writing - facts that Duran neither challenges nor even 
mentions in his brief- is enough to affirm his dismissal from state 
employment. 
The CSRB's admission of Duran's prior corrective action plan into 
evidence does not constitute reversible error. The CAP was part of Duran's 
documented employment history and admissible by express CSRB rule. But 
even if the CSRB committed error by admitting the CAP, the error was 
harmless and cannot constitute grounds for reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The CSRB's factual findings are supported by substantial 
evidence and its decision was reasonable and rational. 
The CSRB did not err when it upheld DTS's decision to terminate 
Duran's employment. Duran argues that the CSRB acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously by adopting unsupported factual findings and upholding his 
termination. But Duran fails to understand the deferential standard that the 
CRSB is required to apply to agency decisions. "The CSRB is restricted to 
determining whether there is factual support for the Department's charges 
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against [a grievant] and, if so, whether the Department's sanction of 
dismissal is so disproportionate to those charges that it amounts to an abuse 
of discretion." Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dept ofCorr., 942 P.2d 933, 
942 (Utah 1997); Sorge, 2006 UT App. 2 at f 22. 
Here, substantial evidence from the entire evidentiary record supports 
DTS's allegations that Duran violated DTS and DHRM rules and policies. 
Based on those factual findings, the CRSB correctly determined that DTS's 
decision to fire Duran was not an abuse of discretion, but instead was '"based 
upon just cause and to advance the good of the public service." R. 000661. 
This Court should affirm the CRSB. 
A, Duran failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
factual findings. 
The CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed because Duran failed 
to marshal the evidence supporting those findings.4 This Court has explained 
4
 In addition, Duran's brief completely fails to cite the record. As a 
general matter, the Court "need not, and will not consider any facts not 
properly cited to, or supported by the record/' Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l 
Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). Like Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County, 2004 UT 98, f 21, 104 P.3d 1208, the Court might "navigate the 
record/' but should not be required to. Moreover, the Brief incorrectly 
identifies and attaches exhibits not entered into evidence at the Step 5 
hearing. See DTS's Motion To Strike Extra-Record Material from 
Appellant's Brief filed contemporaneously with this Answer Brief. 
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that "the process of marshaling the evidence serves the important function of 
reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the 
fact finder." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). Before 
this Court "will subject an agency's findings to the substantial evidence 
test, the party challenging the findings 'must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
[agency's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" 
VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting 
First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990)) (bracketed material in original). 
Marshaling is an arduous and painstaking process that this Court has 
compared to becoming the devil's advocate, where the challenging party 
must present every scrap of competent evidence supporting the challenged 
finding: 
Counsel must remove himself or herself from the client's shoes 
and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent 
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding 
resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
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Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 727-28 (Utah App. 2002) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted, emphasis in original); West Valley v. Majestic Inu. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Duran has fallen well short of his obligation to marshal the evidence 
supporting the CSRB's decision. Instead, he "merely states those facts most 
favorable to his position and ignores the contrary evidence. This is not 
adequate." Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah App. 1998). 
In addition, Duran's challenges to the factual findings are largely 
semantic, constitute disagreements with the inferences to be drawn from the 
facts, or are simply not supported. For example, Duran argues that it is 
improper to call the witnesses who testified about their personal contact with 
him "complainants" because they never filed formal complaints against him. 
Besides being wrong, Duran's challenge is entirely beside the point. The 
record shows that the three co-workers reported Duran's behavior to 
supervisors and others. R. 000272, 274-275; R. 000669 pp. 31, 34-35, 41-42, 
59, 202, 205, 210-211, 218. It also shows that they repeatedly asked Duran to 
cease the objectionable behavior. R. 000261, 275, 287. Although it is doubtful 
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that Duran would prefer the term "victims" instead of "complainants," both 
terms fit the evidence here.5 
This Court has made clear that factual findings will not be overturned 
"[e]ven if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Whitear, 973 
P.2d at 984; Hurley v. Ed. of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 5^6-27 (Utah 1998); see 
also Crane v. Indus. Comm'n, 97 Utah 244, 92 P.2d 722, 723 (Utah 1939) 
(court will not disturb reasonable inferences from the fact-finder). But that is 
exactly what Duran asks the Court to do. He challenges the findings that the 
co-workers felt threatened or intimidated because none actually used those 
terms in their testimony. But the Hearing Officer properly made that 
inference based on the testimony that Duran's conduct was creepy, 
threatening, and that the co-workers were scared, overwhelmed, shocked, 
speechless, uncomfortable, embarrassed, and wanted to avoid Duran to the 
point that they were reluctant to ask him for computer assistance. See 
Statement of Facts and section LB. below. 
5
 Like his defenses at Step 5 and 6, Duran's challenge to some of the 
findings is shockingly cavalier. For example, in response to Nielson's 
objection to being touched, Duran unabashedly remarks that she likely has 
"body issues." Aplt's Brief at 30. See also Decision and Final Agency Action 
at p. 20 n. 16, R. 000669-668; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decision at p. 32-33, R. 000254-297. 
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Accordingly, on the basis of Duran's failure to marshal alone, this 
Court should hold that the CSRB's factual findings are conclusive. See 
Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985. This Court has no reluctance to affirm based only 
on a failure to marshal. Id. And this Court should affirm the CSRB's 
determination that DTS's decision to terminate Duran's employment was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
B. Substantial evidence supported DTS's decision. 
Substantial evidence supported DTS's decision to terminate Duran's 
employment. Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of 
evidence and something less than the weight of the evidence." Johnson v. 
Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 842 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah App. 1992). 
Substantial evidence6 is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that 
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Larson 
Limestone Co. v. State, 903 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1995) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
6
 The CSRB defines substantial evidence to be "evidence possessing 
something of substance and relevant consequence, and which furnishes 
substantial basis of fact from which issues tendered can be reasonably 
resolved. It is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion, but is less than a preponderance." Utah Admin. Code 
R137-1-2. 
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Although not DTS's burden, some of the many facts supporting DTS's 
decision to terminate Duran's employment are listed below: 
• Duran repeatedly invited co-workers to lunch or coffee after 
the invitations were refused, and he was asked to stop. 
• Duran constantly asked offensive personal questions about 
co-worker's lives and physical intimacy. 
• Duran offered to set up a spy camera in a co-worker's 
home and continued the conversation despite being told it 
was creepy. 
• Duran made comments about co-workers' body types and 
the physical attributes that he found personally attractive. 
• Duran inappropriately touched a co-worker's back. 
• Duran asked a co-worker for a massage and continued to do 
so even after being told "no" and in front of another 
employee. 
• His co-workers asked him to stop his behavior again and 
again, but to no avail. 
• Duran was the only computer service worker for DWS's 
Woods Cross Office. 
• Duran's office was across the hall from the women's 
restroom, making it difficult for female co-workers to avoid 
going near his office. 
• Co-workers became reluctant to ask Duran for computer 
help because they did not want to interact with him. 
• Duran was aware of DHRM rules and DTS policies. 
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• Duran's conduct made the work environment threatening 
and intimidating. 
Moreover, credibility counts. Credibility assessments will not be 
overturned on appeal because the fact-finder is in the best position to make 
those assessments. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f 18, 40 P.3d 611; 
Renegade Oil, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App. 356, f 10, 101 
P.3d 383. The Hearing Officer noted that Duran's "testimony was self-
serving at best. Very little of it, if any seemed credible." Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision at p. 32, R. 000254-297. The Utah Supreme 
Court has long recognized that one credible witness is enough to support a 
factual finding. See, e.g., Valiotis v. Utah Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 
P. 802, 810 (Utah 1919). Here, substantial evidence supported DTS's 
decision to end Duran's state employment. This Court should affirm. 
C. DTS's decision to terminate Duran's employment was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
Because substantial evidence supported DTS's allegations against 
Duran, its decision to fire him need only be a valid exercise of discretion. An 
agency abuses its discretion only when it reaches an outcome that is "clearly 
-22-
against the logic and the effect of such facts as are presented in support of the 
application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn 
from the facts disclosed upon the hearing." Sorge, 2006 UT App. 2 at f 22 
(quoting Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 
1991)). In other words, if "reasonable minds might differ as to the propriety 
of the penalty imposed, this fact serves to fortify the conclusion that the 
[administrative body] acted within the area of its discretion." Utah Dep't of 
Corr. v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Szmaciarz v. 
Cal State Personnel J3d, 79 CaLApp.3d 904, 405-06 (1978)) (alteration in 
original). 
Here, DTS was well within the bounds of its discretion to dismiss 
Duran. His behavior compromised DTS's ability to serve its customers. 
DWS employees tried to solve computer problems on their own or asked 
others to help them, compromising DWS's ability to do its work. And, even 
if the CSRB or this Court might have chosen a different form of discipline, 
DTS did not abuse its discretion when it chose termination as the appropriate 
penalty. 
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D, Termination of Duran's employment can be affirmed 
based solely on Duran's attempts to dissuade a co-worker 
from putting her concerns about his behavior in writing. 
This Court can affirm the CSRB's decision based only on Duran's 
attempt to prevent Gomberg from detailing her objections to his conduct in 
writing. Even if this Court were to ignore all of the other evidence supporting 
DTS's decision to terminate Duran's employment, his conduct in this 
instance is more than enough to support his dismissal from state 
employment. 
DHRM rules provide that agency management may discipline any 
employee for "(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable 
policy, including but not limited to . . . agency professional standards, 
standards of conduct and workplace policies. Utah Admin. Code R477-11-
(l)(a). See also Addendum C (providing the text of the relevant DHRM and 
DTS rules and policies). DTS's code of conduct states that "Employees shall 
treat their fellow employees respectfully and professionally." R. 000672 Ex. 
A-15 p 2. DTS employees "shall not engage in unprofessional conduct on . . . 
the job that compromises the ability of the employee or agency to fulfill 
professional responsibilities." R. 000672 Ex. A-15 p 4. DTS Policy Code of 
Conduct, Section 1.2.1.3.2.4. DTS policy also provides that "Employees shall 
use non-abusive, respectful, and decent language (this prohibits any . . . 
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activity that is demeaning, belittling, or knowingly offensive to other 
employees.)" Id. at section 1.2.1.2.1.3. R. 000672 Ex. A-15 p 3. And finally, 
agency management may discipline any employee for " (e) misfeasance, 
malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of public service." 
Utah Admin. Code R477-ll-(l)(e). 
The record evidence shows that Gomberg told Duran that she was going 
to put her concerns about his conduct in writing. Upon hearing this, Duran 
became agitated. He told her that she should not do that because: 1) a copy of 
the letter would be placed in her personnel file and prevent her from being 
hired elsewhere; 2) that he would retaliate and file a false discrimination 
complaint against her; and 3) that everyone in the office, including 
management, would think that they had had sexual relations. R. 000669 pp. 
39-40. Duran does not challenge those facts, and he neglected to mention 
them in his brief. 
As the CRSB noted, "Mr. Duran's conduct in this regard can only be 
described as intimidating, threatening, disrespectful and unprofessional." R. 
000657-658. Duran's conduct erodes any semblance of workplace trust and 
disrupts the employees' work, the work of DTS, and that of DWS. The 
conduct is in clear violation of DHRM and DTS rules and policies not only 
governing professionalism and respect, but those proscribing activity that is 
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demeaning, belittling, or knowingly offensive to other employees. Even in its 
best light, the conduct was clearly inappropriate and patently offensive under 
any professional standards or in any work environment. 
That conduct standing alone is sufficient ground for this Court to affirm 
the CRSB's decision to uphold Duran's termination. 
II. The CSRB's decision to allow Duran's prior corrective action 
plan into evidence was not reversible error. 
Utah law is clear that an "erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful." 
Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997) 
{quoting Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 
1996)). Harmful error occurs where "the likelihood of a different outcome in 
the absence of the error is 'sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in 
the [final decision]/" Id. (quotation omitted). Here, Duran's 2003 
corrective action plan (CAP) was properly admitted into evidence as part of 
his established employment history, but even if the CAP should have been 
excluded, any error was harmless. 
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A. Res judicata does not bar admission of the 2003 CAP. 
Res judicata, in the form of issue preclusion, does not apply to exclude 
the 2003 CAP from evidence. Issue preclusion bars re-litigation of issues 
decided in a prior action and applies only when: 1) the issue challenged in the 
current case is identical to the issue decided in the prior case; 2) the issues 
was decided in a final judgment on the merits; 3) the issue was competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated; and 4) the party against whom issue preclusion is 
invoked must have been a party or in privity to a party in the first action. 
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^ 37, 16 P.3d 1214. Here, 
except for the identity of parties, none of the other elements are present. 
First, the challenged issues are not identical. DTS's decision to 
terminate Duran's employment was not based on the allegations and facts 
supporting to the prior, withdrawn letter of reprimand or the CAP. Instead, 
DTS's decision hinged on Duran's conduct beginning in 2004. DTS never 
tried to re-litigate prior alleged discipline or misconduct.7 
7
 DTS agreed that a January 29, 2003 intent to reprimand and March 
28, 2003 letter of reprimand should be excluded from evidence because the 
Department of Workforce Services withdrew the letter of reprimand and the 
CSRB dismissed Duran's appeal of the letter of reprimand, by order dated 
June 12, 2003, based on the agency's decision to withdraw the discipline. 
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Second, the prior action neither resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits, nor were any of the issues competently, fully, or fairly litigated. A 
judgment is not "on the merits" if it represents a decision on some point 
other than the issues of law and fact that "must be disposed of in order to 
determine whether the parties have good claims or defenses under the 
applicable substantive law." Bailey v. Desert Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 701 
P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1985) (citing Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co. v. Cyprus 
Mines Corp., 660 P.2d 973, 976 (Kan. 1983)). 
Here, DWS voluntarily dismissed the prior CSRB case because it 
withdrew Duran's discipline and chose instead to put Duran on a CAP. In 
issuing the Order Dismissing Appeal, the CSRB had no authority to prevent 
the agency from pursuing other discipline or corrective action based on the 
facts justifying the rescinded written reprimand. The CSRB lacks 
jurisdiction to review corrective action, having only limited jurisdiction over 
personnel matters. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (1) (a); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-302 (detailing what matters an employee may take to the 
CSRB). Thus, it follows that the CSRB cannot order an agency to issue or 
withhold corrective action, and accordingly, there was never any adjudication 
"on the merits." See, e.g., SMP, Inc. u. Kirkman, 843 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 
App. 1992) (industrial commission lacked jurisdiction to review contract claim 
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directly and therefore res judicata inapplicable). Nor did the CSRB 
determine any facts or make any decision on whether the letter of reprimand 
or the CAP were appropriate. Accordingly, res judicata does not bar DTS 
from introducing the CAP into evidence. 
B. CSRB rule specifically allows admission of the prior CAP. 
It is well-settled that evidence of prior disciplinary action is appropriate 
for consideration at the CSRB. Two basic issues are before the CSRB: first, 
whether the agency's factual allegations are supported by substantial 
evidence; and second, whether the agency's chosen disciplinary sanction is 
"excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion." 
See Utah Admin. Code R137-l-21(3)(a), (b). 
Duran's established employment history is relevant and necessary to 
the analysis of the second issue—the propriety of the chosen disciplinary 
sanction. The administrative rules governing the CSRB explicitly provide 
that "the past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of 
either mitigating or sustaining the penalty when substantial evidence 
supports an agency's allegations." Utah Admin. Code R137-1-2K9). 
In addition, administrative rules governing the human resource 
department provide that "when deciding the specific type and severity of 
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discipline, the agency head or representative may consider the following 
factors: . . . prior disciplinary/corrective actions;. . . previous oral warnings, 
written warnings and discussions; . . . [and] the employee's past work 
record/' Utah Admin. Code R477-ll-3(l)(e), (f), (g). See also Addendum C. 
Thus, all evidence touching on an employee's past work record, including 
disciplinary actions, is admissible. The 2003 CAP was part of Duran's 
documented work history and was admissible. The CSRB correctly refused to 
exclude it from evidence. 
C. Any error in the CAP's admission into evidence was 
harmless. 
Even if admission of the 2003 CAP were error, that error was harmless. 
Harmless error is one that although properly preserved below and presented 
on appeal, is sufficiently inconsequential that the court concludes that there 
is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 958 (Utah App. 1993). At its heart, 
Duran's argument is that if the CAP had not been admitted into evidence, 
the CSRB would not have upheld DTS's decision to terminate his 
employment. But Duran cannot show that admission of the 2003 CAP had 
any affect on the case's final outcome. 
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Significantly, the CSRB specifically noted that "Mr. Duran's 2003 
corrective action had little or no bearing on the decision in this matter. Even 
without evidence of Mr. Duran's 2003 corrective action, the evidentiary 
record supports the Hearing Officer's decision in this matter/' R. 00659. 
There is nothing to indicate a "reasonable likelihood" that admission of the 
CAP changed the outcome of the case. Nor does the CAP's admission 
undermine confidence in the decision. But see Lucaq v. Murray City Civil 
Serv. Commn, 949 P.2d 746, 757 (Utah App. 1997) (Reversible error because 
exclusion of evidence undermined confidence in commission's decision to 
uphold employee's discharge). 
As explained in parts I. B, C, and D above, Duran cannot show that the 
outcome of the case would have been any different had the CAP been 
excluded. There is no reversible error here. This Court should therefore 
affirm the CSRB's decision upholding the termination of Duran's 
employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The CSRB did not err when it upheld DTS's decision to end Duran's 
state employment. Duran failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
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decision. To the extent that this Court considers Duran's factual challenge, 
the CSRB correctly concluded that substantial evidence supports DTS's 
decision. And even if the Court were to ignore the facts that Duran 
challenges, the facts that he neither challenges nor mentions in his brief 
regarding his behavior in trying to dissuade a co-worker from putting her 
concerns about his conduct in writing is enough to support the decision to 
terminate his employment. Finally, because Duran cannot show that any 
error in the admission of his prior corrective action plan was more than 
harmless, this Court has no grounds upon which to reverse the CRSB's 
decision. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the CRSB's final agency 
action in all respects. 
Dated this * day of December, 2009. 
^\SLqOM ? . J& t f t ^ 
PEGGY E M O N E 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Utah Department of Technology 
Services 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
JOHN M. DURAN, : 
DECISION 
Grievant and Appellant, : AND 
: FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, 
Agency and Cross-Appellant : Case No. 10 CSRB 94 
On Wednesday, December 17,2008, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its final review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties followed 
by an executive session. The following Board Members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and then deliberated in an executive session: Joan ML Gallegos, Acting Chair; 
John A. Mathews and Kevin C. Timken, Board Members. At this hearing, John M. Duran 
(Mr. Duran) was present and represented by Charles R. Stewart, Attorney at Law, who presented 
oral argument on Appellant's behalf1 Assistant Utah Attorney General Timothy D. Evans 
represented the Utah Department of Technology Services (Department and DTS) and presented oral 
argument on the Department's behalf Accompanying Mr. Evans as the Department's Representative 
was Larene Wyss, Human Resource Manager assigned to the Department. 
!The Board notes that at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing in this matter, Mr. Duran was represented 
by David W. Brown, Attorney at Law. On May 2, 2008, the Hearing Officer issued her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 Decision). On May 14,2008, Mr. Duran filed his Notice of Appeal 
from Step 5 to Step 6. In his appeal, Mr. Duran specifically states: "Conies now the Grievant/Appellant John 
M. Duran Pro Se and files his Notice of Appeal from Step 5 to Step 6 from a Findings of Fact, Conclusion 
[sic] of Law and Decision, dated May 2nd, 2008 
Thereafter on May 15,2008, Mr. Brown filed z. Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel By Motion and Stipulation 
for Extension of Time to File Appellant Brief dated September 12, 2008, Richard G. Uday of SCHATZ, 
ANDERSON & UDAY made an appearance of counsel on Mr. Duran's behalf. Thereafter on November 26, 




The Board's statutory authority is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§67-19a-101 through -408 
of the State Employees5 Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act at §§67-19-1 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in 
the Utah Admin. Code RI37-1-1 through -23. This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final 
administrative review in. the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Mr. Duran's 
appeal from termination of his employment. Both the Board's Step 5 evidentiary and these 
appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-1 -18(2)(a). 
Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (U AP A) pertaining to formal 
adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. (§§63G-4~101 etseq,) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
I. Proceedings Before the Department 
Review of the Step 5 evidentiary record in this matter and the appeal briefs filed by the 
parties establishes that on June 7, 2007, Mr. Duran was given notice of the Department's intent to 
dismiss (Notice of Intent) him from employment with the Department as a Technical Support 
Specialist EL (Tr. I at 288-291, 294; Ex. A-13; Step 5 Decision %ll at 6; Brief of Appelant [sic] 
Appeal from Step Five Decision of Administrative Law Judge (Duran Brief on Appeal) at 
Addendum A)2 The Department's Notice of Intent was issued by Jim Matsumura, Information 
Technology Director. (Ex. A-13) This Notice of Intent appropriately informed Mr. Duran of his right 
to appeal the Department's intent within five working days. (Id.) At the time this Notice of Intent 
was issued, Mr. Duran had been employed by the Department for approximately two years. (Tr. I at 
243-244; Duran Brief on Appeal, Addendum A; Step 5 Decision %3 at 3)3 
2The Board notes that in his brief on appeal to this Board, Mr. Duran refers to himself as Appellant. 
The Board further notes that the Department cross-appealed the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision. Based 
upon these factors, and for clarity purposes, throughout this decision the Board will refer to Mr. Duran as 
"Mr. Duran" and the Department as "Department" or "DTS." 
3It is clear from the evidentiary record that in 2000, Mr. Duran was originally hired by the Utah 
Departmeut of Workforce Services as a Technology Specialist. (Tr. I at 243-244; Tr. II at 437; Duran Brief 
on Appeal, Addendum A; Step 5 Decision %%2,3 at 3) By Legislative action in 2005, Mr. Duran's position, 
as well as all other technology services' positions within the State, transitioned to a new department titled 
the Utah Department of Technology Services. (Id) 
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The Department's June 12, 2007 Notice of Intent recommended that Mr. Duran's 
employment be terminated for violation of numerous Department and State workplace policies and 
procedures. Specifically, the Department's Notice of Intent alleged that over an extended period of 
time beginning late in 2004, Mr. Duran prolonged a documented pattern of unprofessional, 
disrespectful and offensive behavior toward identified co-workers. (Ex. A-13) The alleged 
misconduct outlined in the Notice of Intent included Mr. Duran's persistent pattern of asking female 
co-workers questions regarding their personal relationships - including inquiries relating to physical 
intimacy —and recurring comments regarding the physical attributes of his female co-workers. (Id.) 
The Notice of Intent further alleged Mr. Duran continuously pressed female co-workers to go to 
lunch, dinner or to have coffee with him. (Id.) These behaviors all egedly persisted despite repeated 
refusals from those he asked and numerous requests that all such personal inquiries stop. (Id) 
The Notice of Intent also alleged that Mr. Duran's inapprqpriate and offensive conduct 
included Mr. Duran's actual touching of a co-worker and his request of a second co-worker that she 
give him a massage. (Id.) In addition, the Notice of Intent specifically alleged that Mr. Duran 
violated departmental policies governing professional work relationships during a discussion with 
a female co-worker regarding the placing of a "spy system" in her home. (Id) 
As a result of these allegations, the Department charged Mr. Duran with violating 
Department Policy Code of Conduct (DTS Policy), Sections 1.2.1.2.1; 1,1.2.1.2.1.2,1.2.1.2.13 and 
1.2.1.3.2.4 all of which govern generally professional and respectful work relationships. (Id) The 
Department further alleged that Mr. Duran's conduct violated Department of Human Resource 
Management (DHRM) Rule R477-9-l(l)(a)(ii), R477-1 M(l)(a), (c) and (e). (Id) 
After receiving the Department's Notice of Intent, Mr. Duran appropriately filed a timely 
appeal with the Department.4 (Ex, A-20) On July 9, 2007, a hearing regarding the Department's 
Notice of Intent to terminate Mr. Duran's employment was held before J. Stephen Fletcher, 
4DHRM rule R477-11-2(2) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a career service position 
unless... 
(a) The agency head or designee shall notify the employee in 
writing of the specific reasons for the proposed dismissal 
or demotion. 
(b) The employee shall have up to five working days to 
reply 
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(Exec. Dir. Fletcher) Chief Information Officer and Executive Director for the Department. 
(Tr. II at 348-350, 388; Ex. A-14)5 On M y 10,2007, Exec. Dir. Fletcher issued the Department's 
Final Decision - Dismissal for Cause (Final Decision) terminating Mr. Duran1 s employment with 
the Department. (Id) 
In his Final Decision, Exec. Dir. Fletcher specifically found there was adequate cause or 
reason to terminate Mr. Duran* s employment. (Id) In reaching this decision, Exec. Dir. Fletcher 
stated: 
I have considered your response from the M y 9,2007 meeting as well as . . . taken 
into consideration your comments concerning the allegations raised against you. In 
the meeting you did not present... adequate evidence to reconsider the Department's 
recommendation. 
(id) 
Based upon these factors, Exec. Dir. Fletcher terminated Mr. Duran's employment for: 
[Noncompliance with and for violation of DHRM Rule Employee Conduct, for 
noncompliance with and for violation of DHRM Rule 477-9-1 (1 )(a)(ii), DHRM Rule 
R477-1 l-l(lXa), DHRM Rule 4774 l-l(l)(e), Department of Technology Services 
(DTS) Policy Code of Conduct, Section L2.1.2.1.1, Section L2.1.2.L2, Section 
12.12.13, Section 12.1.3.2.4, for failure to maintain agency professional standards, 
for failure to advance the good of the public service, and for just cause. 
(id) 
After making these determinations, Exec. Dir. Fletcher terminated Mr. Duran5 s employment 
effective M y 10, 2007. (Id) Thereafter, on M y 11, 2007, Mr. Duran timely filed an appeal of 
Exec. Dir. Fletcher's Final Decision with the CSRB. 
II. Proceedings Before the Career Service Review Board 
As set forth above, on M y 11, 2007, Mr. Duran filed a timely appeal with the CSRB 
challenging the Department's Final Decision terminating his employment Thereafter, a 
prehearing/scheduling conference was held identifying the issues in dispute and the facts to be 
resolved at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing in this matter.6 On August 28, 2007, the CSRB 
5Pursuantto Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)(d), a career service employee with the state of Utah may 
not be dismissed from employment unless the employee has had an opportunity to be heard by the department 
head or designated representative. 
6A Step 5 evidentiary hearing is specifically identified in the CSRB Admin istrative rules as a fife novo 
evidentiary hearing conducted before a hearing officer. (Utah Admin. Code R137-1-4.) This hearing allows 
the parties to provide sworn testimony, cross-examine witnesses and place documents into the official record. 
(See Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21.) 
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Administrator issued a Prehearing/Scheduling Conference Summary and Order (PHC Summary and 
Order). This order broadly outlined the issues in dispute to be adjudicated at the Step 5 evidentiary 
hearing and the issues of fact to be resolved.7 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing in this matter, Mr. Duran filed a motion with the CSRB titled 
Grievant 's Motion in Limine, (Motion in Limine)8 By this motion, Mr. Duran moved the Hearing 
Officer to exclude from the hearing evidence pertaining to any disciplinary action against Mr. Duran 
that had previously been withdrawn or rescinded. In his motion, Mr. Duran also moved to exclude 
all evidence relating to a 2003 corrective action Mr. Duran was required to complete. Regarding the 
2003 corrective action, Mr. Duran argued that because this corrective action was based substantially 
on the same conduct supporting the Department's withdrawn and rescinded discipline, due process 
mandated it not be used at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing. 
In its opposition to Mr. Duran's Motion in Limine, the Department conceded that the 
withdrawn and rescinded disciplinary action as well as the intent supporting that discipline could not 
be used at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing. Indeed, review of the file in this matter establishes that the 
Department never attempted to place the withdrawn and rescinded discipline or any intent supporting 
that discipline into the record. 
However, while conceding that the withdrawn and rescinded discipline and intent could not 
be used at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing, the Department nevertheless argued that documents 
regarding Mr. Duran's 2003 corrective action were admissible as evidence of Mr. Duran's "past 
employment record." {Agency Memorandum in Opposition to Grievant's Motion in Limine at 3) In 
arguing that Mr. Duran's 2003 correction action was admissible, the Department relied largely on 
CSRB rule R137-l-21(9) which explicitly allows that: 
[T]he past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either 
mitigating or sustaining the penalty when substantial evidence supports an agency's 
allegations. 
On April 1,2008, Hearing Officer Katherine A. Fox (Hearing Officer Fox) issued her Order 
on Grievant's Motion in Limine. By this Order, the Hearing Officer granted Mr. Duran's motion to 
7The PHC Summary and Order is part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB Office. 
8Mr. Duran's Motion in Limine as well as all memoranda supporting and opposing this motion are 
part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB Office. 
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exclude from the evidentiary hearing evidence of prior disciplinary action against Mr. Duran that had 
been withdrawn and rescinded. This order included the intent supporting the previously withdrawn 
and rescinded discipline. However, the Hearing Officer also ruled that documents relating to 
Mr. Duran's 2003 corrective action could be used during the Step 5 evidentiary hearing as evidence 
of his established employment record. Specifically addressing this issue in her order, the Hearing 
Officer stated: 
It is axiomatic that an employee's prior work record, including disciplinary matters, 
may be relevant in Step 5 proceedings to help assess the reasonableness of the 
Agency's actions, including application of discretionary factors articulated in the 
Department of Human Resource Managements rule R4774-3, and the sanction 
imposed. See Utah Admin. Code R137-l-2l(9); R477-ll-3(e), (f) and (g); 
R137-l-21(3)(a)and(b). 
On April 3-4,2008, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before Hearing Officer Fox. At 
this hearing, Mr. Duran was represented by David W. Brown, Attorney at Law. The Department was 
represented by Timothy D. Evans, Assistant Utah Attorney General. Mr. Evans was assisted by 
Ceil Miller, Paralegal with the Office of the Utah Attorney General. Meredith John, Human 
Resource Specialist with DHRM was present as the Management Representative for the Department 
A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings and administered oaths to the 
witnesses. 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold evidentiary hearings can be found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-406. Moreover, because Mr. Duran's employment was terminated, the Department 
had the burden of proving its case by substantial evidence and the burden of going forward at the 
evidentiary hearing. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(a) and (c)) The specific issues adjudicated 
at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing are twofold First, did the Department terminate Mr. Duran's 
employment for just cause or for good of the public service as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
67-19-18? Second, if the Department's decision to terminate Mr. Duran's employment was not for 
just cause or for the good of the public service, what is the appropriate remedy? (PHC Summary and 
Order ^ J3 at 2; Step 5 Decision at 2) 
At the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Hearing Officer received evidence relating to 
the specific charges against Mr. Duran. This evidence included testimony given and documents 
received concerning Mr. Duran's alleged violations of departmental policies generally governing 
professional and respectful work relationships. 
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Specifically, evidence was received at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing relating to the 
Department's allegation that over a prolonged period of time, beginning in late 2004 and continuing 
until he was placed on administrative leave, Mr. Duran extended a documented pattern of 
unprofessional, disrespectful and offensive behavior toward co-workers. This evidence included 
testimony and documents establishing that during this period, Mr. Duran frequently engaged female 
co-workers in conversations that were highly personal in nature. These conversations often involved 
troubling inquiries by Mr. Duran regarding his co-workers1 private relationships including inquiries 
regarding physical intimacy. (Tr. I at 48-49,112-113; Ex. A-1) Evidence was also received regarding 
Mr. Duran's recurring comments regarding the physical attributes of certain co-workers and 
comments regarding what he considered personally attractive. (Tr. I at 43,48-49,158-160,168,174-
175,184-185; Ex. A-l) Evidence was also presented that many of these highly personal comments 
continued even after Mr. Duran was asked to cease making them. (Tr. I at 40, 44-48, 54-56; 
Ex. A-16) 
In addition, evidence was received supporting the Department's allegation that Mr. Duran 
inappropriately touched one female co-worker and requested that a second co-worker massage his 
leg or foot (Tr. I at 118-119, 162-164; Exs. A-13, A-16) Mr. Duran persisted in asking for this 
massage even after the employee had declined his request and in the presence of another co-worker. 
(Tr. I at 118-121) 
There was also evidence presented at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing supporting the 
Department's allegation that Mr. Duran engaged in highly inappropriate conduct when discussing 
a spy camera with one of his co-workers. (Tr. I at 31 -35, 54,118) Evidence was received showing 
that Mr. Duran continued this specific discussion even after being asked by the co-worker to stop 
because the discussion was "creepy." (Id.) Evidence was also received supporting the Department's 
claims that during this period of time Mr. Duran repeatedly pressed certain female co-workers to go 
to lunch, dinner or have coffee with him. These requests persisted despite repeated refusals and 
requests that such inquiries stop. (Tr. I at 51-53,156-158,184) 
Finally, testimony was given and documentary evidence received at the Step 5 evidentiary 
hearing relating to the Department's allegations that Mr. Duran's offensive conduct created a 
threatening and intimidating work environment for co-workers. This evidence included testimony 
regarding Mr. Duran's comments to a female co-worker after she informed Mr. Duran that she was 
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going to place her concerns about his conduct in writing. (Tr. I at 31-41, 54-56; Ex. A-16) 
Specifically, this evidence included testimony that Mr. Duran attempted to intimidate this co-worker 
by threatening to file a false discrimination complaint against her and by stating that if she 
memorialized her concerns, management and others in the office would assume they had slept 
together. (Id) Evidence was also presented indicating that Mr. Duran further attempted to pressure 
this employee from placing her concerns in writing by stating that the letter would be placed in her 
file as well and follow her throughout her career. (Id ) 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer entered her Step 5 Decision 
dated May 2, 2008. In her Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer outlined the evidence presented at 
the evidentiary hearing and concluded that substantial evidence supported the Department's 
allegations that Mr. Duran's conduct violated departmental policies governing professional and 
respectful work relationships. (Step 5 Decision at 35) The Hearing Officer further concluded that 
Mr. Duran's violations of these departmental policies constituted just cause for terminating 
Mr. Duran employment and that the Department's decision to terminate Mr. Duran's employment 
was not "excessive, disproportionate or an abuse of discretion." (Id at 34) 
Specifically addressing her finding in this matter, the Hearing Officer concluded: 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances and the substantial evidence that was 
presented at the Step 5 hearing, this hearing Officer finds that Grievant's [Mr. Duran] 
dismissal was reasonable in light of the charges. The Agency exercised its discretion 
to decide upon the discipline and the discipline, particularly in light of previous 
discipline as well as corrective action and other notices and warnings about the same 
or similar type of inappropriate workplace conduct, is not excessive, disproportionate 
or an abuse of discretion, 
(Id) 
Based upon these findings, the Hearing Officer upheld the Department's decision to terminate 
Mr. Duran's employment and affirmatively denied his appeal. (Id. at 35) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In the instant case, both parties appealed the Hearing Officer's decision to Step 6 of the 
State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. Mr. Duran filed his appeal on May 14, 2008. The 
Department filed its cross-appeal on May 16,2008. 
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On appeal to this Board, Mr. Duran challenges numerous a$peets of the Hearing Officer's 
Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Mr. Duran argues that many of the factual findings relied upon by the 
Hearing Officer in upholding the Department's decision to terminate his employment are simply not 
supported by substantial evidence and therefore the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that 
Mr. Duran's dismissal was "reasonable in light of the charges.'1 (Duran Brief on Appeal at 2) 
Mr. Duran also challenges the severity of discipline imposed upon him arguing that "the conduct 
of the Grievant [Mr. Duran] did not warrant termination, as there was not substantial evidence 
presented to justify such an extreme form of discipline." (Id) 
On appeal Mr. Duran also argues that the Hearing Officer misapplied relevant policies and 
rules in upholding the Department's decision. In making this argument, Mr. Duran essentially 
restates his position that the record evidence fails to establish his conduct actually violated 
established policies governing professional and respectful co-worker interaction or policies 
specifically proscribing conduct considered harassing, discriminatory, demeaning, offensive or which 
interferes with professional responsibilities. (Duran Brief on Appeal at 12-15) 
Finally, Mr. Duran challenges the Hearing Officer's decision to allow evidence of the 
2003 Corrective Action Plan to be received at the evidentiary hearing. (Id at 2, 16) Specifically 
addressing this issue in his brief, Mr. Duran argues: 
The 2003 CAP having been drafted by Agency based on the same offenses alleged 
in the Written Reprimand... and the Career Services Board [sic] having dismissed 
the Agency's case with prejudice . . . prior records of the action should not be 
considered by this board, and was error for the hearing officer to have done so. 
(Id at 16)9 
I 
In essence, Mr. Duran challenges the Hearing Officer's finding that substantial evidence 
supported the principal allegations relied upon by the Department in reaching its decision to 
terminate his employment. He also argues that because substantial evidence did not support many 
of the Department's allegations, the hearing Officer erred in finding the Department's termination 
of his employment was not excessive or disproportionate. Mr. Duran further argues that the Hearing 
Officer misapplied relevant policies and procedures in upholding thp Department's decision to 
terminate his employment. Finally, Mr. Duran argues that the Hearing Officer erred not only in 
*CAP is the acronym uniformly recognized within the State for a "Corrective Action Plan." 
John M Duran v. Utah Deot. of Technology Services, Case No. 10 CSRB 94 Page 9 
000647 
receiving evidence at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing regarding his 2003 corrective action, but by 
considering this evidence to reach her decision that the Department's termination of Mr. Duran's 
employment was reasonable and rational. 
Not surprisingly, in its appeal to this Board, the Department does not challenge the Hearing 
Officer's ultimate decision upholding the Department's termination of Mr. Duran' s employment. On 
appeal, the Department simply argues that the Hearing Officer erred in excluding evidence 
concerning Mr. Duran's prior convictions at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing. Specifically addressing 
this issue in its appeal to this Board, the Department argued that: "Grievanf s [Mr. Duran's] 
conviction for a crime of violence was relevant to a determination of a core issue in this case: 
whether the Agency acted properly in deciding to terminate Grievant's [Mr. Duran's] employment. 
(Agency's Brief on Cross-Appeal to Step 6 at 5) However, in its appeal, the Department also stated 
that f,the Board needs to consider this appeal only if the Board overrules the Hearing Officer's Step 
5 decision upholding the termination of Grievant's [Mr. Duran's] employment." (Id. at 2) (Emphasis 
added.) 
As required by statute, the Board reviews and decides the parties' appeals. To the extent 
required by law, the Board will now review and analyze the facts and issues presented by the parties 
on appeal and address the dispositive issues raised by the parties. 
IL THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1 -22(4)(a) - (c), which 
reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational 
according to the substantial evidence standard. When the board 
determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are 
not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as 
a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factual 
findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of 
the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected 
the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a 
whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing 
officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes 
in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
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granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the 
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed 
by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate 
factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and 
statutes determined according to the above provision^. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the 
Department's disciplinary penalty of termination of Mr. Duran's employment is reasonable and 
rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with the correct application of 
relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer. 
BOARD'S REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L FACTUAL EVENTS CRITICAL TO THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION 
TO TERMINATE MR. DURAN'S EMPLOYMENT 
As stated above, the Board's first obligation on review is to make a determination of whether 
the factual findings of the Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard. ( Utah Admin, Code R137-l-22(4)(a)) In the instant case, the Hearing Officer 
received testimony from numerous witnesses including Mr. Duran himself regarding the 
Department's allegations that while employed with the Department, Mr. Duran violated several 
departmental policies and procedures governing professional and respectful work relationships. 
Documents were also received into evidence supporting the Department's allegations that beginning 
in late 2004, Mr. Duran extended a documented pattern of unprofessional, disrespectful and 
offensive behavior toward co-workers. This evidence included not only documents of prior 
discipline, but numerous other written letters of warning or concern regarding Mr. Duran's 
inappropriate or unprofessional interaction with co-workers. (Exs. A-2, A~3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-9, 
A42) This documentary evidence also included a letter of concern from a co-worker to Mr. Duran 
John ML Duran v, Utah DepL of Technology Services, Case No. 10 CSRB 94 Page 11 
000649 
regarding his inappropriate conduct and the corrective action subject to Mr. Duran's Motion in 
Limine. (Exs. A-1, A-8, A-11) Finally, the documentary evidence included Department policies and 
procedures generally governing professional and respectful co-worker interaction and various policy 
understanding statements signed or acknowledged by Mr. Duran. (Exs. A-15, A-18, A-19, A-21, 
A-23, A-26) 
After carefully considering the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and reviewing the 
documents received into evidence, the Hearing Officer issued her decision. This decision set forth 
several dispositive facts crucial in her decision to uphold the Department's termination of 
Mr. Duran's employment (Step 5 Decision ffl 9,20,21,24,26,28,30,32 at 6-9) Among the many 
facts relied upon in upholding the Department's decision to terminate Mr. Duran's employment, the 
Hearing Officer found that over a prolonged period of time beginning late 2004 and continuing until 
he was placed on administrative leave, Mr. Duran extended a documented pattern of unprofessional, 
disrespectful and offensive behavior toward co-workers. (Step 5 Decision fflf), 20,21, 24,26, 28 
at 6-8) The Hearing Officer found this conduct to include Mr. Duran asking female co-workers 
highly personal questions including inquiries regarding physical intimacy. (Id ff 19,20, 24, 26 at 
6-8) The Hearing Officer further found that Mr; Duran made comments regarding the physical 
attributes of co-workers and shared with certain co-workers the physical traits he considered 
personally attractive. (Id Hf 19,21,24,28 at 6-8) The Hearing Officer also found that many of these 
highly personal comments continued after Mr. Duran was asked to cease making them. (Id ff 19, 
20,24,26,28 at 6-8) 
The Hearing Officer further found substantial evidence supported the Department's allegation 
that Mr. Duran inappropriately touched one female co-worker and requested that a second co-worker 
massage his leg or foot. (Id. ^[20,21,26,28 at 6-8) The Hearing Officer also found that Mr. Duran 
persisted in asking for this massage after the employee had repeatedly denied his request. (Id. ff20, 
26 at 6-8) 
The Hearing Officer also found that Mr. Duran continuously pressed certain female 
co-workers to go to lunch, dinner or have coffee with him and that these requests persisted despite 
repeated refusals and requests that such invitations stop. (Id 1flj24,26,28 at 7-8) She further found 
Mr. Duran used inappropriate and offensive language when discussing the placement of a spy camera 
in a co-worker's home. (Idljfl 19,24 at 6-7) Finally, the Hearing Officer found substantial evidence 
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supported the Department's allegation that after Mr. Duran was told by a co-worker that she was 
going to memorialize her concerns about his conduct in writing, Mr. Duran engaged in knowingly 
offensive, unprofessional and intimidating conduct toward this coworker. The Hearing Officer 
found this conduct included Mr. Duran threatening that if she did put her concerns in writing, 
everyone would think they had slept together. (Id f 24 at 7) 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the sworn testimony 
of the witnesses and the documents submitted into evidence, this Board finds the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings as set forth in the Step 5 Decision to be reasonable, rational and supported by 
substantial evidence.10 In reaching this decision, the Board stresses that it has consistently held that 
findings made by a factfinder are entitled to a presumption of correctness. (Chournos v. Utah 
Department of Workforce Services, 8 CSRB 74, Step 6 Decision (2004); Jones v. Utah Department 
of Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38, Step 6 Decision (1992); See also, Parks & Recreation v. Anderson, 
3 PRB 22 at 7-8, Step 6 Decision (1986).)11 In granting such deference to the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings, the Board notes that it is the Hearing Officer alone who hears the testimony, weighs 
the evidence and is therefore in the best position to judge the veracity of the witnesses' statements. 
In detennining the Hearing Officer's factual findings to be reasonable and rational, the Board 
first notes that during the evidentiary hearing in this matter, persuasive evidence was provided 
establishing that over an extended period of time, Mr. Duran engaged in a pervasive pattern of asking 
female co-workers highly personal questions including inquiries regarding their physical intimacy 
with others. (Tr. I at 48-49, 112-113; Ex. A-l) These inquiries included Mr. Duran specifically 
asking at least one female co-worker how many boyfriends she had had and further commenting that 
she must have been "with a lot of guys." (Tr. I at 48-49; Ex. A-l) Mr. Duran's inappropriate 
l0CSRB rule R137-1-2 defines substantial evidence to be "evidence possessing something of 
substance and relevant consequence, and which furnishes substantial basis of fact from which issues tendered 
can be reasonably resolved. It is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion, but is less than a preponderance." In addressing this evidentiary standard, courts have found that 
substantial evidence "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v State, 903 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1995), 
quoting First Natl Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization,!^ Y2A 1163,1165 (Utah 1990); See also Grace 
Drillingv. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63,68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) Substantial evidence "is more than a mere 
'scintilla' of evidence and something less than the weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Cornrn n, 842 P.2d 910,911 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
uThe PRB was the Personnel Review Board, predecessor to the Career Service Review Board. 
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comments also included his statements that because this co-worker lived in the avenues where the 
homes are close, the neighbors could easily see "when she and my Pier] man were getting romantic." 
(Mat 49) 
Substantial evidence was also received establishing that Mr. Duran frequently commented 
to co-workers regarding their physical attributes and what he personally found attractive in a woman. 
(Tr. I at 43,48-49,158-160,168,174475,1844 85; Ex. A-l) These comments included Mr. Duran 
telling one co-worker that he liked "a girl with a little meat on her" and informing another co-worker 
that she looked like a model and was "Barbie sized" {Id at 43,158-160,168,174-175) Persuasive 
testimony was also presented establishing that these comments continued over a long period of time 
and despite frequent requests that such comments cease. (Id at 45-49, 54-56; Exs. A-l, A-16) 
Evidence was also presented establishing that Mr. Duran inappropriately touched one female 
co-worker and requested that a separate co-worker massage his leg or foot. (Id. at 118-119,162-164; 
Exs. A-l3, A-16) Particularly troubling is the evidence that Mr. Duran persisted in asking for this 
massage well after the employee had said no and that his requests continued in the presence of 
another co-worker. (Id at 118-121) 
Substantial evidence also supports that in late 2004 and continuing until Mr. Duran was 
placed on administrative leave, he frequently pressed certain female co-workers to go to lunch, 
dinner or to have coffee with him. (Id 51-53, 156-158, 184) Again, these invitations continued 
despite repeated and unambiguous requests that they stop. (Id) 
The evidentiary record also establishes that in August 2006, Mr. Duran engaged a female 
co-worker in a discussion about placing a spy camera in her home. When informed by this co-worker 
that this idea was "creepy," Mr. Duran responded by stating: "What, do you get shy in* front of a 
camera?" (Id at 33-34) The evidence further establishes that Mr. Duran continued to discuss the spy 
camera with this co-worker even after being requested that he stop. (Tr. I at 33-34, 54) The Board 
also notes that in his appeal to this Board, Mr. Duran does not deny that these comments were made, 
but simply dismisses them as an "awkward attempt at humor" or "traditional workplace banter." 
(Duran Brief on Appeal at 4) After reviewing the testimony regarding this interaction, the Board 
believes these comments were clearly inappropriate and patently offensive under any professional 
standards or in any work environment. 
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Finally, and perhaps most egregious to this Board, is the evidence establishing that Mr. Duran 
engaged in threatening and in intimidating conduct upon learning that a co-worker planned on 
writing a letter memorializing her objections to Mr. Duran's behavior. Indeed, the evidence 
establishes that in an attempt to dissuade this co-worker from memorializing her objections to his 
conduct, Mr. Duran threatened to file a false discrimination complaint against this employee. (Tr. I 
at 39-41, 54-56) In furtherance of this intimidating conduct, the evidence also establishes that 
Mr. Duran told this co-worker that if she memorialized her concerns about his conduct, others in the 
office - including management - would assume they had had sexual relations. (Id) Finally, as part 
of this intimidating conduct, Mr. Duran also informed this employee that any letter of concern 
regarding his misconduct would be placed in her employment file as well and would follow her 
throughout her career. {Id) 
Based upon our careful review of the entire evidentiary record, the Board finds the Hearing 
Officer's substantive factual findings to be supported by substantial evidence. The record establishes 
that Mr. Duran engaged in a prolonged pattern of co-worker interaction that was inappropriate and 
unprofessional. This conduct included statements and actions that were threatening, intimidating, 
sexually suggestive and otherwise offensive even if viewed in their most positive light. Therefore, 
based upon the totality of evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Board finds the Hearing 
Officer's factual findings to be reasonable and rational according to a substantial evidence standard 
and therefore upholds the Hearing Officer's factual findings. 
II. THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION TO TERMINATE MR. DURAN'S EMPLOYMENT 
IN LIGHT OF THE ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
In his appeal to this Board, Mr. Duran argues that based on the allegations against him, the 
Department's decision to terminate his employment was unreasonable and therefore, the Hearing 
Officer erred in finding that the Department's decision was not excessive or disproportionate. 
Addressing this issue in his brief, Mr. Duran argues that the "conduct of the Grievant [Mr. Duran] 
did not warrant termination, as there was not substantial evidence presented to justify such an 
extreme form of discipline/1 (Duran Brief on Appeal at 2) 
In ruling on whether the Department's decision to terminate Kir. Duran's employment was 
reasonable and rational in light of the facts of this case, the Board notes that it is affirmatively 
constrained by Utah court rulings addressing this issue. In Utah Department of Corrections v. 
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Despain, 824 P.2d 439 QJt C t App. 1991) the Utah Court of Appeals examined the parameters 
under which the Board may review disciplinary sanctions imposed by departments. At the time of 
Despain, the Board had a rule which stated: 
[I]f the hearing officer finds that the action complained of which was taken by the 
appointing authority was too severe, even though for good cause, the hearing officer 
may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the best 
interest of the respective parties.12 
In Despain, the Utah Court of Appeals found that this language gave the CSRB the "authority 
to modify the Department's sanction only if the Department has abused its discretion in imposing 
that sanction/' (Id) (Emphasis added) In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the reasoning 
set forth in Szmaciarz v. California State Personnel Board, 79 CaL App. 3d 904,145 Cal. Rptr. 396 
(1978) wherein that California Court held: 
[I]f the penalty imposed was under all the facts and circumstances clearly excessive, 
this will be deemed an abuse of discretion... In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion the Supreme Court of this state has stated that "If reasonable 
minds might differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed, this fact serves to 
fortify the conclusion that the [administrative body] acted within the area of its 
discretion/'13 
In the instant case, this Board has already found that there was substantial evidence to support 
the substantive factual findings of the Hearing Officer in this case. Applying the facts gleaned at the 
evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer concluded that: 
12This rule was set forth in Utah Admin, Code, R140-1-20(J) (1990). The Board notes that this rule 
has since been modified and is essentially cabined in the current CSRB R137-l-21(3)(b). 
l3The Board notes with interest that shortly after the Court's decision in Despain, this Board 
amended its rules and has essentially adopted the specific language set forth in the Despain decision. 
Specifically, at CSRB R1374-21(3)(b), the Board adopted the following rule: 
When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with the procedures set forth 
above that the evidentiary/step 5 factual findings support the allegations of the agency or the 
appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether the agency's 
decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or 
otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In making this latter determination, the CSRB 
hearing officer shall give deference to the decision of the agency or the appointing authority 
unless the agency's penalty is determined to be excessive, disproportionate or constitutes 
an abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing officer shall determine the 
appropriate remedy. 
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Looking at the totality of the circumstances and the substantial evidence that was 
presented at the Step 5 hearing, this Hearing Officer finds that Grievant's dismissal 
was reasonable in light of the charges. The Agency exercised its discretion to decide 
upon the discipline and the discipline, particularly in light of previous discipline as 
well as corrective action and other notices and warnings about the same or similar 
type of inappropriate workplace conduct, is not excessive, disproportionate or an 
abuse of discretion. 
(Step 5 Decision at 34) 
At the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Department provided credible evidence 
explaining the many factors considered before deciding to terminate Mr. Duran's employment In 
his testimony at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing, Exec. Dir. Fletcher stated that he considered several 
discretionary factors in determining the type of discipline to impose against Mr. Duran.14 In deciding 
termination of employment was the appropriate discipline to impose in this case, Exec. Dir, Fletcher 
testified that he considered the severity of Mr. Duran's conduct and the negative impact his conduct 
had on the Department's ability to serve its customers. (Tr. II at 365-368) Exec. Dir. Fletcher also 
testified he felt termination of employment was appropriate in this case because Mr. Duran's conduct 
was creating a general feeling of "fear, intimidation, uncomfortableness . . . that . . . lead me to 
believe that this was a fairly high severity for that environment." (Id) Finally, Exec. Dir. Fletcher 
also considered Mr. Duran's prior knowledge — through training and previous written letters of 
l4The Board notes that DHRM rule R477-11-3(1) specifically allows executive directors to consider 
discretionary factors in determining the type and severity of discipline to impose in disciplinary matters. This 
rule specifically provides as follows: 
(1) When deciding the specific type and severity of discipline, the agency head or representative 
may consider the following factors: 
(a) consistent application of rules and standards; 
(i) the agency head or representative need only consider those cases decided under 
the administration of the current agency head. Decisions in cases prior to the 
administration of the current agency head are not binding upon the current agency 
head and are not relevant in determining consistent application of rules and 
standards. 
(b) prior knowledge of rules and standards; 
(c) the severity of the infraction; 
(d) the repeated nature of violations; 
(e) prior disciplinary/corrective actions; 
(f) previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions; 
(g) the employee's past work record; 
(h) the effect on agency operations; 
(i) the potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
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warning or concern - to establish that Mr. Duran understood the professional standards with which 
he was expected to comply and that Mr. Duran's failure to conform his conduct with those 
professional standards necessitated he be terminated from employment. (Id) 
Exercising the discretion granted her under Rl 37-1-21 (3)(b), the Hearing Officer concluded 
that the disciplinary sanction of dismissal was not excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of 
discretion in this matter. This determination was made only after careful consideration of the 
evidence presented at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing and the Hearing Officer's finding that the 
Department's allegations were supported by substantial evidence. 
After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, this Board agrees with the Hearing Officer 
that the Department's decision to terminate Mr. Duran's employment was not excessive or 
disproportionate. The record establishes that the Department exercised appropriate discretion in 
finding Mr. Duran's misconduct so severe and disruptive to agency operations that termination of 
employment was the appropriate sanction. Based upon the established facts of this case, we simply 
do not find the Department's penalty to be "clearly excessive." Therefore, this Board sustains the 
Hearing Officer's decision and finds as a matter of law that the Department's termination of 
Mr. Duran's employment was not excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of discretion. 
ILL APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANT POLICIES AND RULES 
TO THE ESTABLISHED FACTS OF THIS CASE 
On appeal to this Board, Mr. Duran also argues that the Hearing Officer erred by incorrectly 
applying departmental policies and rules in upholding the Department's decision to terminate his 
employment. Correctly summarizing the Board's obligation when reviewing the Hearing Officer's 
application of policies and rules to the established facts, Mr. Duran states: ,![T]he CSRB, giving no 
deference to the Hearing Officer, must decide whether the Hearing Officer has correctly applied the 
relevant policies, rules and statues, under a correctness of error standard." (Duran Brief on Appeal 
at 2) 
As set forth above, the Hearing Officer made several tactual findings regarding Mr, Duran's 
interaction with and conduct toward his co-workers. After making these factual determinations, the 
Hearing Officer found Mr. Duran's conduct violated numerous departmental policies and procedures 
relating generally to professional and respectful co-worker interaction. Specifically, the Hearing 
Officer found Mr. Duran's conduct violated DTS Policy Section L2.1 ;2.1.1 that requires employees 
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treat co-workers "respectfully and professionally." (Step 5 Decision ^10 at 11) She also found 
Mr. Duran's conduct to be in violation of DTS Policy Section 1.2,1.2.1.2 which prohibits employees 
from harassing, stalking, discriminating against, or making unwanted advances or sexually 
suggestive comments to a co-worker. (Id at ^11 at 11) 
The Hearing Officer also found Mr. Duran's substantiated misconduct violated DTS Policy 
L2.1.2.L3 which requires employees to use decent, respectful and nonabusive language with 
co-workers and DTS Policy 1.2.1.2.1.4 which prohibits employees from engaging in conduct that 
compromises an employee's or the agency's ability to fulfill professional responsibilities. (Id at 
1H[12, 13 at 11) Finally, the Hearing Officer also found Mr. Duran's conduct to be in violation of 
State rules governing professional standards of conduct and misfeasance. (Idat %fl, 9 at 10-11) 
After carefully applying these policies and procedures to the facts established by substantial 
evidence in this matter, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's legal conclusions. Review of the 
evidentiary record establishes that Mr. Duran clearly violated departmental policies and procedures 
governing professionalism and respectful co-worker interaction and that these violations occurred 
on repeated occasions. 
Examples of Mr. Duran's unprofessional and disrespectful conduct begin, but unfortunately 
do not end, with his recurring inquiries regarding co-workers private lives including questions about 
sexual intimacy and statements specifying what he found to be physically attractive. These comments 
were clearly unprofessional, inappropriate, potentially demeaning, vulgar, sexually suggestive and 
thus in violation of departmental policy proscribing such conduct. 
Moreover, Mr. Duran's touching of one female employee and requests from another for a 
massage not only violated departmental professional standards, but standards of common decency 
as well. Mr. Duran further violated departmental policy when he engaged a female co-worker in a 
discussion about placing a camera in her home and informed another employee he had "cheated on 
his wife."15 
However, of the many examples establishing Mr. Duran's violation of departmental policies 
governing professionalism, none is more troubling to this Board than the efforts of Mr. Duran to 
dissuade a co-worker from placing her concerns about his conduct in writing. Mr. Duran's conduct 
15The Board references these specific incidents as illustrative only. The record is replete with other 
substantiated acts by Mr. Duran that were in violation of departmental policy. 
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in this regard can only be described as intimidating, threatening, disrespectful and unprofessional.16 
By attempting to dissuade this employee from memorializing her concerns, Mr. Duran violated 
departmental policies not only governing professionalism, but those proscribing knowingly 
offensive, abusive, indecent, demeaning or profane comments. (Ex. A-15) 
In light of all the substantiated facts of this case and our own review of the policies at issue 
in this matter, this Board finds the Hearing office correctly applied relevant policies and rules in 
upholding the Department's decision. Based upon this review, we further find that the Department's 
decision to terminate Mr. Duran's employment to be reasonable and rational when applying the 
established facts in this matter to the relevant policies. 
IV. REVIEW OF THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE REGARDING 
M R . DURAN'S 2003 CORRECTIVE ACTION 
As set forth above, Mr. Duran argues the Hearing Officer erred by allowing evidence of his 
2003 corrective action to be received at the evidentiary hearing. (Duran Brief on Appeal at 2, 16) 
Specifically addressing this issue in his brief, Mr. Duran argues: 
The 2003 CAP having been drafted by Agency based on the same offenses alleged 
in the Written Reprimand... and the Career Services Board [sic] having dismissed 
the Agency's case with prejudice . . . prior records of the action should not be 
considered by this board, and was error for the hearing officer to have done so. 
(ii£atl6) 
Essentially, Mr. Duran argues that evidence of the 2003 corrective action should have been 
excluded from the evidentiary hearing because it was based primarily on the same conduct that 
formed the basis of the rescinded discipline. According to Mr. Duran, because the Department 
determined to discipline him and thereafter - on its own volition - reversed itself and instead 
imposed corrective action, the Department should be barred from using the substantive facts 
supporting the corrective action as part of his employment history. 
After carefully considering Mr. Duran's argument, the Board finds the Hearing Officer did 
not err by receiving evidence regarding Mr. Duran" s 2003 corrective action at the evidentiary hearing 
I5The Board is not surprised that in response to Mr. Duran's attempt to dissuade her from placing 
her concerns in writing, this co-worker went outside the work premises and began crying because she was 
"just so scared and overwhelmed." (Tr. I at 41) However, what is surprising to this Board is that Mr. Duran 
fails to recognize the offensiveness of his conduct and his general belief that much of his conduct amounted 
to normal "office banter" or "awkward humor." 
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or considering this evidence in reaching her final decision. In making this finding, the Board first 
notes that this Board has consistently allowed evidence of an employee's past employment record 
to be used and considered at a Step 5 evidentiary hearing. Indeed, our own rules explicitly allow 
evidence of an employee's past employment record whenever a disciplinary penalty is at issue. 
Specifically, CSRB rule R137-l-21(9) provides that: 
[T]he past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either 
mitigating or sustaining the penalty when substantial evidence supports an agency's 
allegations. 
In the instant case, we find the provisions of this rule have been met. Substantial evidence 
supports the Department's allegation that for an extended period of time beginning in late 2004, 
Mr. Duran prolonged a documented pattern of unprofessional, disrespectful and offensive behavior 
toward identified co-workers. Based upon this finding, we find no error in the Hearing Officer's 
admission or consideration of Mr. Duran's 2003 corrective action as part of his established 
employment history. While it is true this corrective action was based substantially on the same 
conduct supportingthe Department's withdrawn and rescinded discipline, it was nonetheless relevant 
to assist the Hearing Officer in either mitigating or sustaining the penalty imposed by the 
Department. Based on these factors, the board finds that the Hearing Officer's consideration of 
Mr. Duran's 2003 corrective action does not implicate due process protections. 
In reaching this decision, the Board also notes however, that Mr. Duran's 2003 corrective 
action had little or no bearing on the decision in this matter. Even without evidence of Mr. Duran's 
2003 corrective action, the evidentiary record supports the Hearing Officer's decision in this matter. 
Numerous documents were admitted establishing that Mr. Duran knew of the Department's policies 
in general and its code of conduct in particular and was given training on all relevant policies. There 
is no question from review of the evidentiary record that Mr. Duran knew and understood what was 
expected of him. (Exs. A-14, A-18, A-19, A-21, A-23, A-26) Based upon these factors, we agree 
with the Hearing Officer that based upon the totality of circumstances, the Department's termination 
of Mr. Duran's employment was reasonable in light of the charges, and not excessive, 
disproportionate nor an abuse of discretion. (See generally Step 5 Decision at 34) 
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IV. REVIEW OF THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF 
MR* DURAN'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
On appeal to this Board, the Department argues the Hearing Officer erred in excluding 
evidence at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing regarding Mr. Duran's prior convictions. Specifically 
addressing this issue in its appeal to this Board, the Department argued that "Grievant's 
[Mr. Duran5 s] conviction for a crime of violence was relevant to a determination of a core issue in 
this case: whether the Agency acted properly in deciding to terminate Grievant's [Mr. Duran's] 
employment (Agency Brief on Cross-Appeal at 5) 
After carefully considering the Department's arguments regarding this issue, we find the 
Hearing Officer correctly excluded evidence concerning Mr. Duran's prior convictions at the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing. In reaching this decision, the Board primarily notes that Mr. Duran's prior 
convictions were simply not relevant in determining whether Mr. Duran violated departmental 
policies and procedures generally governing respectful and professional conduct. Mr. Duran's 
employment was terminated for violating specific departmental and State policies regarding 
workplace conduct and that termination was based on specific employment related conduct. The 
Board believes that admission of Mr. Duran's criminal history is not only irrelevant, but could have 
potentially created undue bias in the factfinder. 
Finally, while the Board recognizes that based upon our ultimate finding in this matter it is 
practically unnecessary to address the Department's appeal at this time, it nonetheless exercises its 
discretion to do so. The Board feels that admission of Mr. Duran's prior criminal history would have 
been improper. For this reason, we uphold the Hearing Officer's decision excluding such evidence 
from the record and affirmatively deny the Department's appeal. 
DECISION 
The Board has addressed the issues raised by the parties in their respective appeals. After 
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record and carefully applying the relevant policies and rules 
at issue in this matter, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision for the reasons set forth 
herein, and affirmatively denies Mr. Duran's appeal and the Department's appeal to this Board. The 
Board finds the Hearing Officer's decision to be reasonable and rational and supported by substantial 
evidence. The Board further finds that the Hearing Officer correctly applied all relevant policies and 
rules in rendering her decision. Based upon the evidence presented at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing 
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in this matter, the Board finds the Department's decision to terminate Appellant's employment to 
be based upon just cause and to advance the good of the public service and upholds the Hearing 
Officer's decision sustaining Mr. Duran's termination of employment 
DATED this 4th day of March 2009. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Joan ML Gallegos, Acting Chair 
John A. Mathews, Member 
Kevin C. Timken, Member 
ku.ru 
M. Gall egos 
Acting Chair 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of tbis Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action 
by complying with Utah Admin. Code R137-1 -22(10), and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-302, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of tbis formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-11, and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 and 403, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 
Case No. 29 CSRB/H.0.433 
Hearing Officer: Katherine A. Fox 
The Step 5 hearing to determine the above-captioned matter was held April 3-4,2008, in the 
State Office Building at the State Capitol Complex in Salt Lake City, Utah, before Katherine A. Fox, 
Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer (Hearing Officer). John M. Duran (Grievant) was 
present and represented by David W. Brown, Attorney at Law. The Utah Department of Technology 
Services (Agency/DTS) was represented by Timothy D. Evans, Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
Meredith John, Human Resources Specialist, was present as the Management Representative and 
Ceil Miller assisted Mr. Evans in her capacity as a paralegal for the Office of the Attorney General. 
A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings. Witnesses (four for Grievant 
including himself and six for the Agency)1 were placed under oath, and testimony and documentary 
evidence (one exhibit for Grievant and 18 exhibits for the Agency)2 were received into the record. 
Because Grievant worked for both agencies in a technological capacity, for ease of reference the 
Department of Workplace Services (DWS) and the Utah Department of Technology (DTS) will be 
collectively referred to as the Agency at times. 
^rievant's witnesses included: Melissa Youngman, Jeff DeJuncker and Stephanie Gonzales. 
Grievant also testified. Witnesses for the Department included: JoAnna Gomberg McNamee, 
Monica Hulbert, Lindsay Neilson, James (Jim) D. Howard, Jim Matsumura, and J. Stephen Fletcher. 
At the time of Grievanf s dismissal, Ms. McNamee was known as Ms. Gomberg. For clarity, I will refer 
to Ms. McNamee as Ms. Gomberg for the reminder of this decision. 
Neither party introduced all the exhibits that were originally marked for submission. As a 
consequence, there sometimes are numbering gaps in the record. Also, only one admitted exhibit was 
marked as MG" for Grievant, but at least one of the "A" documents (marked for Agency) was submitted 
on Grievant's behalf. 
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AUTHORITY 
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold this Step 5 evidentiary 
hearing is found at Utah Code Ann. § 67~19a-406 and Utah Admin. Code R137-1-1 et seq. Having 
heard and reviewed the evidence of record and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the 
Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, UtahCodeAnn. § 63~46b-2 (l)(h)(i)), now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, 
ISSUES 
Is there a basis in law and in fact to support by substantial evidence the Agency's termination 
action? If not, what is the appropriate remedy? 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Grievant's attorney filed a Motion in Limine on March 17,2008, to exclude certain evidence 
from the Step 5 hearing and the Agency filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Grievantfs Motion 
in Limine on March 20,2008. Thereafter in a flurry of activity, Grievant filed a Reply Memorandum 
on March 26,2008, and the Agency responded with a. Reply Memorandum on March 28,2008. Later 
the same day, Grievant filed an Objection to Agency's Exhibits and Motion to Strike Agency's Reply 
Memorandum. On April 1, 2008, the Agency filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Grievant's 
Objection to Agency's Exhibits and Motion to Strike. The Hearing Officer ruled on the issues in an 
Order on Grievant's Motion in Limine on April 1,2008. 
Grie vant*s primary argument was that no evidence or testimony pertaining to any disciplinary 
actions that had previously been withdrawn and dismissed with prejudice should be permitted at the 
hearing, and that the only proper discipline related evidence should be confined to that occurring in 
2006 and thereafter. Grievant also contended that disciplinary evidence prior to 2003 that had not 
been withdrawn and dismissed should be excluded because it lacked relevance and because Utah 
Rules of Evidence 401, 402 and 403 allegedly prohibiting admission of such evidence applied. 
Moreover, because there was substantive overlap between the alleged facts underlying the discipline 
which had been previously withdrawn and Grievanfs subsequent Corrective Action Plan (CAP), 
counsel argued that due process concerns made admission of CAP evidence improper as well. 
The Agency agreed that any discipline occurring in 2003 that had been withdrawn and 
dismissed should be excluded, but also maintained that evidence of other prior disciplinary actions 
was relevant insofar as it could properly be considered when weighing the propriety of the final 
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termination action. In arguing that Grievant's work record, including the 2003 CAP was relevant, the 
Agency cited Utah Admin, Code R477-11-3 (l)(e), (f), and (g) which states: "[w]hen deciding the 
type and severity of discipline, the agency head ... may consider the following factors: ...prior 
disciplinary/corrective actions ... previous oral warning, written warning and discussions ...[and] 
the employee's past work record." The Agency also pointed out that under applicable CSRB 
provisions, Utah Rules of Evidence did not apply to Step 5 formal adjudications. 
The Hearing Officer's ruling addressed these issues. Her order granted Grievant's motion to 
exclude all disciplinary evidence which previously had been withdrawn and dismissed. The order 
also denied the motion to exclude Grievant's other (general) work record evidence. Thereafter, during 
the Step 5 hearing, Grievant reiterated his objections to the CAP being admitted and both attorneys 
periodically raised similar and related objections to proposed evidence and testimony. Some of these 
issues will be discussed below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Grievant was a career service employee with the State and qualifies to use these Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures. 
2. Grievant was hired by DWS in 2000 as a Technology aka IT Specialist to assist that 
department with its technology needs. Grievant had a criminal history and clearly disclosed this 
information to DWS prior to being hired. 
3. Sometime thereafter in 2005, Grievant transitioned from DWS to a newly created agency, 
DTS. 
4. Grievant's office was next to the women's bathroom in the DWS Woods Cross office. 
5. Early on in Grievant's employment, James (Jim) Matsumura wrote a Letter of Concern 
dated September 25,2000, which Grievant acknowledged receiving on October 18,2000. The letter 
addressed Grievant's "language and content of your communication with other employees at DWS." 
It referenced Grievant discussing his "life experiences... that might be construed as intimidating 
and threatening" and further stated that "comments about criminal behavior ... can be deemed 
offensive and/or create an atmosphere of intimidation which is inappropriate in the workplace. " 
(Ex.A-7) 
6. On January 29, 2003, DWS issued an Intent to Reprimand letter. On March 28, 2003, 
DWS issued a Letter of Reprimand. Neither of these documents were considered nor admitted into 
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evidence on the basis that Grievant had appealed the intended discipline and thereafter, on June 6, 
2003, DWS filed a motion for withdrawal (Motion to Vacate Written Reprimand and Dismissal 
Before the CSRB). On June 12, 2003, the CSRB dismissed Grievant's appeal (Order Dismissing 
Appeal) thereby vacating the intended disciplinary action in Case No. 22 CSRB/H.O. 317.3 
7. The intended January 29 and March 28,2003 disciplinary actions were properly removed 
from Grievant's personnel file pursuant to the provisions in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-303(4)(c). 
8. On April 1, 2003, Grievant acknowledged receiving a Corrective Action Plan dated 
March 25,2003, The CAP outlined five major areas of concern: (1) customer service; (2) proper use 
of time, prioritizing work, and completion of work; (3) improvement of team building and team 
work skills; (4) proper professional behavior in the workplace with regard to creating a positive work 
environment which means ... avoid [ing] any intimidating conversation, behavior and conduct; and 
(5) accurate reporting of time and attendance. (Ex. A-8) 
9. Section 4 of the CAP stated in pertinent part: 
Proper professional behavior in the workplace with regard to creating a positive 
work environment which means you must avoid intimidating conversation, 
behavior, and conduct which could lead to violation of Department policies on 
harassment, hostile workplace issues. Care and concern about your speech and 
behavior will enhance the professional climate of the work place and instill in others 
trust and comfort with your work efforts. 
1) You are not to discuss your criminal history, encounters with 
law enforcement, and involvement in any criminal behavior 
with individuals at work or in the presence of other staff, 
DWS employees, vendors, clients, or business partners. You 
are not to have any communication with DWS customers or 
clients who may be in the office for business or services. 
3See generally the discussion above under "Procedural Background/1 This issue was considered 
prior to the Step 5 hearing. Grievant filed a Motion in Limine to exclude, in pertinent part, these 
particular disciplinary actions among others as well. The Motion in Limine also requested that 
evidence related to the CAP be excluded. The Agency responded and stipulated to exclusion of the 
January 29 and March 28,2003 discipline. The Agency did not agree to exclude other past disciplinary 
evidence nor non-disciplinary evidence such as the CAP. Thereafter, the Hearing Officer issued an 
Order on Grievant's Motion in Limine excluding the January 29 and March 28,2008 evidence only. 
Related to the ruling, at the Step 5 hearing, the Hearing Officer also redacted selected portions of other 
documents admitted into evidence referencing specific incidents which had been the subject of the 
intended discipline and thereafter withdrawn and dismissed. 
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2) You are to arrange with HR to take and complete by the end 
of month two of your corrective action period department 
training on prevention of unlawful harassment. 
(Ex. A-8) 
10. On May 9,2003, Jim Matsumura issued a Letter of Warning outlining issues relating to 
Grievant's time and attendance problems. No concerns were expressed over Grievant's inappropriate 
conduct with female employees. (Ex. A-9) 
11. In a memo dated October 15,2003 to Grievant, Jim Matsumura informed Grievant that 
he had successfully completed his CAP. 
12. On April 1,2004, Jim Matsumura issued a Letter of Warning to Grievant who, while 
acknowledging receipt of the document, indicated that he denied the allegations. (Ex. A-12) The 
Letter of Warning outlined previous concerns regarding time and attendance problems as well as 
inappropriate conduct. 
13. On February 6,2006, James Howard drafted and discussed with Grievant a document 
referred to as a "complaint" or a 'Verbal complaint" outlining various concerns about Grievant's 
behavior, including but not limited to "service requests are not addressed timely, sleeping while at 
work, a lack of approachability and a lack of communication." No concerns were expressed over 
Grievanfs inappropriate conduct with female employees. (Ex. A-2) 
14. On February 9, 2006, James Howard issued a Letter of Warning which Grievant 
acknowledged receiving on the same date. The Letter of Warning outlines concerns regarding 
Grievant's conduct two days earlier, i.e., taking long breaks and lunches, napping and poor customer 
service response. No concerns were expressed over Grievantfs inappropriate conduct with female 
employees. (Ex. A-3) 
15. On May 18,2006, James Howard issued a Letter of Intent to Discipline which Grievant 
acknowledged receiving the following day. The Letter of Intent to Discipline primarily addressed 
the types of issues Grievant was notified about in February, i.e., sleeping on the job. No concerns 
were expressed over Grievant's inappropriate conduct with female employees. (Ex. A-4) 
16. On June 1, 2006, James Howard issued a Letter of Reprimand which Grievant 
acknowledged receiving the following day. The Letter of Reprimand was for "displaying 
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unprofessional behavior as discussed in the letter of intent, including sleeping during work time." 
No concerns were expressed over Grievant's inappropriate conduct with female employees. (Ex. A-5) 
17. On June 7,2007, Jim Matsumura issued an Intent to Dismiss (Intent to Dismiss) letter 
recommending to the Agency's Executive Director that Grievant be terminated. (Ex. A-13). The 
letter summarized allegations raised in an investigation indicative of a "pattern of inappropriate 
behavior" and "unlawful and work place harassment of four [DWS] female employees." There were 
four sets of employee complaints set forth in the letter, but only three of the complainants testified 
at the Step 5 hearing. 
18. Allegations contained in the complaint by the female employee who did not testify in 
the Step 5 evidentiary hearing were not considered by the Hearing Officer in reaching this Decision. 
19. Agency allegations of misconduct relating to Complainant # 1 (Jo Anna Gomberg) raised 
during the investigation and cited in the Intent to Dismiss in pertinent part were: "Asked her about 
30 times to have lunch with you in the first eight months of her employment... although she rejected 
your advances on each occasion ... continually asked her personal questions such as how many men 
she had slept with, threatened to set up a spy system at her home . . . resulting in her having to 
change her residence and told her that you like your women to have some meat on them, with 
reference to her anatomy." 
20. Agency allegations of misconduct relating to Complainant #2 (Monica Hulbert) raised 
during the investigation and cited in the Intent to Dismiss in pertinent part were: "On or about her 
fourth day at work ... you asked her for personal information, including her boy friend, her marital 
status, and the father of her child; pressed her for lunch dates several times and on each occasion she 
rejected your advances; asked her to have coffee with you several times . . . and she rejected your 
advances; followed her into the break room and requested that she massage your leg." 
21. Agency allegations of misconduct relating to Complainant # 4 (Lindsay Neilson) raised 
during the investigation and cited in the Intent to Dismiss in pertinent pint were: "Ogled her almost 
every working day in the first month of her employment and continually asked her to drive her car; 
told her because she was nice, you would take her to lunch and she refused ... you continued to ask 
her out to lunch; you teased her about her sweater . . . told her that she belonged in the Barbie 
section ... touched her lower back that was uncovered . . . she was shocked by your behavior and 
decided to avoid all interactions with you including not asking you for technical assistance...." 
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22. The Intent to Dismiss stated that after considering the discretionary factors articulated 
in DHRM Rule 477-11-3, Grievant was being terminated for: "noncompliance with and for violation 
of DHRM Rule 477-9-l(l)(a)(ii), DHRM Rule 477-1 l-(l)(a), DHRM Rule 477-1 l-(l)(c), DHRM 
Rule 477-1 l-(l)(e), Department of Technology Services (DTS) Policy Code of Conduct, 
Section 1.2.1.2.1.1, Section 1.2.1.2.1.2, Section 1.2.1.3.2.4, for failure to maintain agency 
professional standards, for failure to advance the good of the public service, and for just cause." 
(Ex.A~13) 
23. On July 10, 2007, J. Stephen Fletcher, DTS Chief Information Officer and Executive 
Director, issued the Final Decision ~ Dismissal for Cause (Final Decision). (Ex. A-14) The Final 
Decision stated that Grievant was being dismissed based on the following: "On March 6,2007, the 
Department received a complaint from several employees who work for the Department of 
Workforce Services. The complaint included allegations of unlawful harassment and work place 
harassment... [t]he specific allegations and the Department's recommendation for termination, are 
outlined in the letter of intent issued to you on June 7,2007. These allegations are violations of work 
place policies, rules, procedures, or standards." The Final Decision referenced the rules and policies 
stated in the Intent to Dismiss. 
24. Grievant asked JoAnna Gomberg (Ms. Gomberg) to go to lunch, coffee and doughnuts 
numerous times despite being told "no" every single time. He gave Ms. Gomberg an "up and down 
stare" on a regular basis and told her such things as "you really dress good" and "I like a woman with 
a little meat on her." He repeatedly asked her inappropriate and personal questions about her 
boyfriend and other matters of personal intimacy. He told her that he had been in jail and that he had 
tough friends and gang friends. He told her about other women in the department with whom he 
allegedly had sexual relations. Grievant asked Ms. Gomberg if he could install a "SpyCam" at her 
house and asserted that he was working as a private investigator. After Ms. Gomberg sent Grievant 
an email expressing her discomfort with his behavior, Grievant informed her that everyone would 
think they had slept together. He made many other comments to her of an objectionable nature 
despite being told she was offended. 
25. Ms. Gomberg was offended, intimidated and embarrassed by Grievanfs relentless and 
unwanted attentions. She wanted to avoid him and eventually was reluctant to ask him for computer 
assistance when problems arose. 
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26. Grievant asked Monica Hulbert (Ms. Hulbert) to go to lunch, coffee and dinner 
numerous times despite being told "no" every single time. Within the first week of her employment, 
he began asking her inappropriate and personal questions relating to her marital status and the father 
of her child. He repeatedly asked her unwelcomed and personal questions about what she did in her 
spare time, specifically if she went to clubs to drink and "party." He asked to drive her car. He asked 
Ms. Hulbert to massage his foot and persisted when she declined. He told Ms. Hulbert that he had 
been in jail, had cheated on his wife, was tracking a spouse who was suspected of being unfaithful, 
and had been incarcerated. He made many other comments of an offensive nature on a repeated basis 
to Ms. Hulbert despite being told she found them objectionable. 
27. Ms. Hulbert was offended, intimidated and embarrassed by Grievanfs relentless and 
unwanted attentions. She wanted to avoid him and eventually was reluctant to ask him for computer 
assistance when problems arose. 
28. Grievant "ogled" Lindsay Nielson (Ms. Nielson) on her first day of work at DWS and 
continued to inappropriately "look her up and down." He repeatedly told her that she looked like a 
model even though she asked him to stop. He repeatedly asked her to lunch even though she told him 
"no." Grievant continually referred to Ms. Niclson's clothing as "Barbie doll sized" and on one 
occasion, touched her back to indicate where her "Barbie doll sized" sweater ended. He made many 
other comments of an offensive nature on a repeated basis to Ms. Nielson despite being told she 
found them objectionable. 
29. Ms. Nielson was offended, intimidated and embarrassed by Grievant's relentless and 
unwanted attentions. She wanted to avoid him and eventually was reluctant to ask him for computer 
assistance when problems arose. 
30. On one occasion, Grievant asked Jeff DeJuncker (Mr. DeJuncker) and another male 
co-worker at lunch to discuss the relative attractiveness and physical attributes of female co-workers. 
31. Grievant was selective in choosing which female employees he repeatedly subjected to 
inappropriate comments and conversations. The employees were all young and physically attractive. 
32. Grievant took sexual harassment training several times and should have known that his 
conduct was objectionable and inappropriate in the workplace. 
33. Grievant should have realized his conduct was unacceptable because those female 
employees he targeted repeatedly told him it was. 
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34. Grievant had been put on written notice at least three times not to reference or discuss 
his criminal history in the workplace because it could be construed as intimidating and threatening 
and because it could be deemed offensive and/or create an atmosphere of intimidation which is 
inappropriate in the workplace. He also had been verbally warned not to reference or discuss his 
criminal history in the workplace. 
35. laaccordanccwith Utah Code Ann, § 67-19a-303(4)(c), properly designated disciplinary 
records were removed from Grievanf s personnel file. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In CSRB proceedings, a hearing officer may take judicial notice of all CSRB rules, the 
Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rules, Agency rules and policies, and any 
other relevant statutes, rules and policies without their specific admission in the record of the 
hearing. 
2. The Agency bears the burden of proof that the discipline imposed in this case was for just 
cause. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(a). The Agency must meet its burden of proof by 
"substantial evidence." Utah Code Ann. §67-19a-406(2)(c). Substantial evidence "is that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v. State of Utah, 903 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1995) quoting First 
National Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); see also Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63,68 (Utah App. 1989). "It is more than a mere Scintilla' of 
evidence and something less than the weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of 
Industrial Comm'n, 842 P.2d 910,911 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. The hearing officer must determine whether the factual findings, as determined by 
substantial evidence support the allegations made by the Agency, and whether the Agency has 
correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Utah Admin. Code R137-1 -2. If the factual 
findings support the allegations, the hearing officer must then determine, giving deference to the 
Agency's decision, whether the Agency's disciplinary action is excessive, disproportionate or 
otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21. In instances where the 
hearing officer determines the Agency's action is excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse 
of discretion, the hearing officer shall determine the appropriate remedy. 
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4. In giving deference to the Agency's decision, the hearing officer is restricted to the 
standards he or she must apply and therefore cannot substitute his or her own judgment. "The CSRB 
is restricted to determining whether there is factual support the Department's charges and if so, 
whether the Departments sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate to those charges that it amounts 
to an abuse of discretion." Career Serv. ReviewBd v. UtahDep'L ofCorr., 942 P. 2d 933,942 (Utah 
1997). An agency abuses its discretion when it reaches an outcome 'that is clearly against the logic 
and the effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application, or against the reasonable 
and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing.n Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23,26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and citations omitted). 
5. The initial burden is on the Agency to show that the discipline was not disproportionate 
to the conduct. Lunnen v. Dep't. of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Thereafter, the burden shifts. Once this burden is met, " [A petitioner] must, at a minimum, carry 
the burden of showing some meaningfiil disparity of treatment between [himself] and other similarly 
situated employees." Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm., et al., 8 P.3d 1048,1056 (Utah Ct 
App. 2000). 
6. R477-9-l(l)(a)(H) states: An employee shall "maintain an acceptable level of performance 
and conduct on ail other verbal and written job expectations." The Agency provided substantial 
evidence to show that Grievant failed to maintain an acceptable level of conduct on verbal and 
written job expectations regarding his interactions with co-workers in violation of Agency policy on 
a repeated basis. 
7. R477-1 l-(l)(a) states that Agency management may discipline any employee for any of 
the following causes or reasons: "(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable 
policies, including but not limited to . . . agency professional standards, standards of conduct and 
workplace policies." The Agency provided substantial evidence to show that Grievant failed to 
comply with applicable rules, policies, professional standards, standards of conduct and workplace 
policies on a repeated basis. 
8. R477-1 l-(l)(c) states that Agency management may discipline any employee for any of 
the following causes or reasons: "(c) failure to maintain skills and adequate performance levels." The 
Agency did not provide substantial evidence to show that Grievant filed to maintain skills or failed 
to perform adequately. 
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9. R477-1 l-(l)(e) states that Agency management may discipline any employee for any of 
the following causes or reasons: "(e) misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance 
the good of the public service." The Agency provided substantial evidence to show that Grievant's 
misconduct resulted in misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance and failure to advance the good of 
the public service. 
10. DTS Policy Code of Conduct, Section 1.2.1.2.1.1 states: "Employees shall treat their 
fellow employees respectfully and professionally." The Agency provided substantial evidence that 
Grievant failed to treat his fellow employees respectfully and professionally on a repeated basis. 
11. DTS Policy Code of Conduct, Section 1.2.1.2.1.2 states: "Employees shall not harass, 
stalk, discriminate against, or make unwanted advances or sexually suggestive comments to another 
employee." The Agency provided substantial evidence to show that Grievant harassed, made 
unwanted advances and made sexually suggestive comments to his co-workers on a repeated basis. 
12. DTS Policy Code of Conduct, Section 1.2.1.2.1.3 states: "Employees shall use non-
abusive, respectful, and decent language (this prohibits any... activity that is demeaning, belittling, 
or knowingly offensive to other employees.)" The Agency provided substantial evidence to show that 
Grievant used disrespectful language and made demeaning, belittling and knowingly offensive 
comments to his co-workers on a repeated basis. 
13. DTS Policy Code of Conduct, Section 1.2.1.2.1.4 states: "Employees shall not engage 
in unprofessional conduct on . . . the job that compromises the ability of the employee or agency to 
fulfill professional responsibilities." The Agency provided substantial evidence to show that Grievant 
repeatedly engaged in unprofessional conduct in the workplace that compromised the ability of 
employees and potentially the Agency to fulfill their professional responsibilities. 
14. DHRM Rule R477-11-3 states in pertinent part: "When deciding the specific type and 
severity of discipline, the agency . . . may consider the following factors: . . . prior 
disciplinary/corrective actions... previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions... [and] 
the employee's past work record." 
15. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-303 (4) (c) (Employees' rights in grievance and appeals 
procedures) provides as follows: If any disciplinary action against an employee is rescinded through 
the grievance procedures established in this chapter, the agency and the Department of Human 
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Resource Management shall remove the record of the disciplinary action from the employee's agency 
personnel file and central personnel file. 
16. Utah Admin. Code R477-10-2 Employee Development (Corrective Action) states in 
pertinent part: 
When an employee's performance does not meet established standards due to failure 
to maintain skills, incompetence, or inefficiency, and after consulting with DHRM, 
agency management may take appropriate and documented corrective action in 
accordance with the following rules: 
(1) The supervisor shall discuss the substandard performance with the 
employee and determine appropriate corrective action. If a written 
corrective action plan is developed or a written warning issued, the 
employee shall sign the plan ... [rjefusal to sign ... shall constitute 
insubordination subject to discipline. 
DISCUSSION 
Grievant was hired by DWS in 2000 in a technology capacity to assist that department with 
its technology needs. Grievant had a criminal background and disclosed this information to DWS 
prior to being hired. Although the documents themselves were not admitted into evidence, Grievant 
testified that his annual performance evaluations were largely "satisfactory" or "good1* over his 
course of employment. Other witnesses such as Jim Matsumura and J. Stephen Fletcher did not 
dispute Grievanfs testimony on this issue. It is clear, however, from other documentary evidence 
admitted into the record that Grievant had recurring workplace issues which DWS and later, DTS 
repeatedly addressed. Over his course of employment, Grievant worked at several different DWS 
locations including the Midvale and Woods Cross offices. 
On July 1,2005, the Utah Department of Technology Services (DTS) was created to provide 
information technology (IT) services to State agencies. These services included but were not limited 
to "hosting," "desk top management," "application development," ongoing "in-house IT 
consultation," and other related functions. J. Stephen Fletcher (Exec. Dir. Fletcher) was hired to 
become the Chief Information Officer and Executive Director of the new organization. Exec. 
Dir. Fletcher testified that the new agency's primary function was to "partner and consult with State 
agencies on IT matters" and do it "better" than the old way of housing technology personnel within 
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the various agencies. Sometime after the new organization was created, Grievant become a DTS 
employee instead of a DWS employee.4 
SUMMARY OF GRIEVANT'S ARGUMENTS 
Grievant's arguments can be broadly categorized as follows: (1) There was an insufficient 
factual basis to terminate him and thus, the necessary legal standard of "substantial evidence" has 
not been met; (2) Some of the alleged facts should not have been relied upon to terminate Grievant, 
and to the extent they were, his due process rights were violated; (3) Grievant was unaware of certain 
policies and rules which the Agency alleged he violated and therefore, he should not be held 
responsible their inadvertent violation; (4) Grievant's conduct did not legally constitute sexual 
harassment and he should not have been terminated on that basis; and (5) Even if substantial 
evidence exists in this case, it does warrant termination because that sanction is excessive and 
disproportionate to the offense. Finally, Grievant argued that since 2006, when he was put on notice 
of his alleged inappropriate conduct, there has been little, if any, misconduct. 
In addressing Grievant's inappropriate workplace conduct, his attorney argued that it was a 
result of lack of "people skills" rather than sexual harassment or intentional intimidation. Grievant 
admitted that he "talked too much" and that the Agency should have provided "sensitivity training" 
when he asked for it. His attorney characterized him as "exercising poor judgment" and being "rough 
around the edges," but argued that any conflicts were due to personality issues and Grievant 
"misreading" his co-workers. While some individuals may have found him offensive, Grievant "did 
not swear or curse, made no threats, and his comments were not sexual in nature." Therefore, 
Grievant's employment should not have been terminated on the basis of sexual harassment. 
Grievant's attorney repeatedly objected to certain documentary evidence and testimony being 
admitted into the record. Part of the objection was that the evidence was too remote in time to be 
relevant or not relevant for other reasons. Another basis for objection was that the factual overlap 
between the basis for the CAP and withdrawn discipline made the former inadmissible. To the extent 
4Exec. Dir. Fletcher testified that most new DTS hires now are "at will" rather than career 
service employees to "enhance flexibility and serve the technology needs of State agencies more 
efficiently." Because Grievant transitioned from DWS to DTS, he was not considered a new "at will" 
employee and therefore kept his career service status. Though now a DTS employee, Grievant 
continued to provide IT services for DWS. 
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due process rights would be violated. 
GRIEVANT'S CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP) 
It is the role of an employer to bring performance issues to an employee's attention. Not every 
employment action an agency takes is disciplinary in nature. The purpose of a CAP is not punitive; 
rather, it is to improve an employee's performance, give the employee an opportunity to resolve the 
specified issues and bring his or her performance to a successful level, A CAP is clearly within an 
employer's discretion to issue. See, e.g., R477-10-2 (Employee Development) (Corrective Action). 
A major difference between a CAP and disciplinary action is that while an employee may not agree 
with the employer's concerns, a CAP may not be grieved or appealed to the Step 5 evidentiary level 
of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. An employee's work record, including past 
disciplinary actions and other actions such as CAP's, however, are relevant factors in an agency's 
assessment of an appropriate disciplinary action under R477-11-3(1). This rule provides that an 
"agency head may consider prior disciplinary/corrective actions . . . and the employee's past work 
record " in determining the type and severity of discipline. R137-l-21(9) states-that "the past 
employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either mitigating or sustaining the 
penalty when substantial evidence supports an agency's allegations. " Thus, an employee's work 
record, including disciplinary actions and other actions such as CAP's, is also relevant in Step 5 
evidentiary hearings to assist the hearing officer to determine the reasonableness of an agency's 
actions. 
In this case, there was some factual overlap between the basis for certain disciplinary 
actions which were withdrawn and dismissed and therefore not properly considered in the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing and the CAP. It is the purpose for which the overlapping evidence was admitted, 
however, that controls. This matter is not a criminal proceeding where the doctrine of the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" applies. While this evidence cannot be considered in a disciplinary context, as 
work record evidence, it is permissible in reviewing the "type & severity" of discipline imposed. 
THE THREE COMPLAINANTS 
A, JoAana Gomberg MacNamce 
Ms. Gomberg began working at DWS in September 2004 as an Employment Counselor with 
Program Services. Ms. Gromberg was a composed and articulate witness. Ms. Gomberg regularly 
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interacted with Grievant in order to resolve a number of technology problems. Their initial 
relationship was more reciprocal at the beginning and she would sometimes engage in short 
conversations with Grievant, asking him questions as well. As time went on, however, and she 
became increasingly uncomfortable, Grievant initiated a "vast majority" of their conversations. 
Shortly after she began working at DWS, Grievant began inviting her to lunch and to go for 
doughnuts and coffee with him. To discourage these invitations, Ms. Gomberg would ask him, 
"Aren't you married? Why do you keep asking me out to lunch?" After consistently telling Grievant 
that she would not go out with him for an extended period of time, she finally told him, "I'm not 
going to lunch with you today, not ever. Going to lunch could be perceived as a date." After that, 
Grievant did not ask her to go to lunch as frequently, but the invitations never stopped. 
Grievant gave Ms. Gomberg an "up and down eye stare" on a regular basis and made 
comments such as, "You really dress good." He told Ms. Gomberg that he "liked a girl with a little 
meat on her." Beginning around the holidays in 2004, Grievant began repeatedly asking 
Ms. Gomberg questions about her boyfriend. For instance, he asked her about her boyfriend's 
appearance ("did he resemble Grievant?") and questioned whether she had cheated on her boyfriend. 
Grievant asked questions of this nature either while Ms. Gomberg was in his office or in the 
relatively "geographically isolated" area in the computer lab. He made these types of comments and 
asked inappropriate questions when co-workers were not present. Ms. Gomberg was aware that 
Grievant made other female employees in the office uncomfortable because she had conversations 
about it with them. 
When Grievant became aware that Ms. Gomberg and her boyfriend were living together, he 
began asking questions relating to physical intimacy. He asked her "if she had been with a lot of 
guys" and would make remarks such as, "111 bet youVe had a lot of boyfriends." Grievant asked 
Ms. Gomberg, "How are things going with your man?" He admitted that this is the "type of tactic" 
that he used to "move in with women." When Grievant became aware that Ms. Gomberg was 
residing in the Avenues section of the city where the houses are closely situated, he remarked "how 
easy it would be for the neighbors to see how close she and her boyfriend were." Ms. Gomberg lost 
some of her composure while testifying about these conversations, and clearly was humiliated that 
she had to talk about it. 
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Grievant also told Ms. Gomberg that he had been in jail He told her that he had f,tough 
friends and gang friends/1 He talked to her about safe and unsafe neighborhoods in the area. Pursuant 
to his request and although she did not want to, Ms. Gomberg gave Grievant a ride to pick up his car 
from a repair shop. Ms. Gomberg became very uncomfortable during the short trip because of 
Grievant's comments ("he seemed somewhat incoherent and said he had taken 4-6 Lortab pills for 
pain that day") and his demeanor ("he was fidgeting and acting strange"). 
After a short period of just flat refusal to answer his personal questions, Ms. Gomberg told 
Grievant over and over again that his comments made her uncomfortable and were offensive. She 
repeatedly asked him not to say things to her that were inappropriate and of a personal nature. 
Grievant did not ask personal questions or make inappropriate remarks as frequently, but the 
comments continued on an intermittent basis. 
In August 2006, Grievant called Ms. Gomberg into his office and told her to look at herself 
on a camera or computer screen. He told her that he had a new "spy camera" for private investigator 
work as he had a job as a private investigator. He explained that he had attached a GPS device to a 
friend's wife's car to track her whereabouts. The friend was a "client" and the client suspected his 
wife of cheating on him. He showed Ms. Gomberg a diagram or map on his computer screen. 
Ms. Gomberg thought that the aerial map may have been a Google Earth image. He then pointed out 
specific sites where the wife's car had stopped at various times. He asked her if she knew anyone that 
he could spy on. When she said "no," he asked if he could set up the spy camera at her house. 
Ms. Gomberg testified that this encounter was particularly upsetting and she left Grievant's office 
in a very emotional state. Ms. Gomberg was visibly upset at this point in her testimony. 
This episode was so disconcerting that Ms. Gomberg discussed it with her father who is an 
attorney. Her father advised her to put her objections about Grievant's conduct in writing and give 
it to him. Before Ms. Gomberg wrote Grievant an email, she approached him to tell him that she was 
going to put her concerns in writing to him. She chose to do so because she knew he would be angry 
if she did not let him know what she intended to do. When Ms. Gomberg told him, Grievant became 
very agitated. He told her that she should not send him the email because: (a) a copy would be put 
into her personnel file and it might prevent her from being rehired somewhere else; (b) he would 
retaliate and tell others that she had made racist remarks; (c) everyone in the office would think that 
they had slept together. This encounter left both of them upset 
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On August 28,2006, Ms. Gomberg sent Grievant an email. The email referenced the recent 
conversation wherein she had approached Grievant 10 days earlier. It objected to various topics 
Grievant had repeatedly introduced into their conversations. Ms Gomberg's email stated that at that 
time, she requested that their discussions "focus on professional issues, and that we eliminate 
personal jokes" because previous discussions had left her uncomfortable. She explained, "During 
previous conversations where I felt uncomfortable, I informed you, and you usually respected my 
request to end the discussion. However, these interactions did not prevent similar conversations of 
that nature." Ms. Gomberg's email also stated that while the list was not all inclusive, she wanted to 
avoid any future discussions relating to: "(1) my physical appearance, the way I dress, and my body 
type; (2) my relationship with my boyfriend; (3) my current or past level of physical intimacy with 
anyone; and (4) other women whom you might find attractive." (Ex. A-l) 
A few days later after the email was sent, Grievant, who had seen Ms. Gromberg, approached 
her and told her that he had not said that he would put a spy camera in her house. He continued 
telling her that he would do that only if someone paid him. The relationship between them became 
even more strained, but Grievant's inappropriate comments slowed dramatically after that. The work 
relationship became more professional than it had been, but primarily because there was so little 
interaction between them. 
Approximately six weeks after Ms. Gomberg sent the email, Grievant was in her office doing 
updates on her computer. Grievant brought up the email. He then commented on his previous sexual 
harassment training. He talked about the women in the department, some married, with whom he had 
presumably slept. Then Grievant said, "You know they think we slept together." Ms. Gomberg 
reacted by getting up and leaving her office. At this point in her testimony, Ms. Gomberg grew 
visibly pale. 
Ms Gomberg said she did not file a grievance against Grievant because she was embarrassed 
over the difficulties she was having with him and was trying to avoid conflict. At first, she 
experienced only minor reluctance to ask Grievant to assist her with computer problems. As time 
went on, Grievant's conduct increasingly affected her willingness to ask him for help. At one point, 
Ms. Gomberg testified that after a period of time, she did not want to work with Grievant at all 
When questioned about his relationship with Ms. Gombeg, Grievant testified that the 
"problem" with her started when they "bumped heads and she exploded when she became a lead 
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[employment counselor]." He denied ever asking her to lunch, but then said he "could" have. 
Grievant's testimony on this issue was clearly disingenuous. His testimony relating to Ms. Gomberg 
giving him a ride to pick up his car was not credible either. He said that he never asked her for a ride, 
but instead, she offered. It is inconceivable to me that she offered to give him a ride where they 
would be alone given her obvious discomfort with him. He admitted that during the ride, he was 
"heavily medicated," but that "nothing happened." Grievant's testimony on this latter point was 
consistent with Ms. Gomberg's. 
Grievant denied telling Ms Gomberg, in response to her telling him that she was going to put 
her concerns about him in writing, that "people will think that we slept together." He also said that 
he did not recall telling her that if she put her objections in writing he would retaliate by saying she 
had made racial slurs. His denials are not plausible, particularly in light of the email Grievant sent 
Mr. Howard (Ex. G-l) and the content of Ms. Gomberg!s email to him. Clearly, Grievant was in a 
state of panic about Ms.Gomberg's email ,"Did you read it where she says she doesn't want to pursue 
it any further... It says she is not filing a grievance, though. That's good. She says she doesn't want 
it to be a greavance (sic) etc, also I spoke with her and she didn't want it to go any further may be I 
can have her call you ... there is no dates or description of what I said and or did " Contrary to 
Grievant's assertions, however, Ms. Gomberg's email to him was fairly specific about the types of 
comments she did not welcome and wanted to avoid in the future. 
Grievant testified that he did not tell Ms. Gomberg that he was a private investigator. He said 
that he was considering whether to engage in this type of outside work and that he had the SpyCam 
delivered to his office for convenience. His characterization of Ms. Gomberg's response to the 
SpyCam he had in his office also was not credible. He said that Ms. Gomberg found it "creepy" and 
then "tripped out" when he merely showed her his house on the camera map. The remainder of their 
"heated conversation," according to Grievant, consisted of talking about the television show 
"Cheaters" and his observation that some people use the camera for tracking individuals suspected 
of cheating on their spouses. He denied telling Ms. Gomberg that he could install it in her house or 
asking her whether he could install it. He admitted, however, telling Ms. Gomberg that if someone 
paid him, he would install the camera at her house. He then seemed to think it strange that "she took 
it personally" and "just walked off1 at that point in the conversation. He concluded his testimony on 
this issue by stating that he never "threatened or intimidated" Ms. Gomberg. 
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Contrary to Grievanf s, I believe Ms. Gomberg's testimony was credible and forthright. Her 
demeanor and body language were consistent with the difficulty of the subject matter. Moreover, 
there was no discernable reason for Ms. Gomberg to lie or even exaggerate about her experience. 
B. Monica Hulbert 
Ms. Hulbert began working at DWS as an employment counselor at the Woods Cross office 
in November 2006. Grievant asked her on her first day at work about her marital status and whether 
she had children. During her first week, after he learned that she was not married, he asked her where 
her child's father was. He began asking her personal questions - "not stuff I discuss with people I 
don't know" - such as what she did on the weekends, did she drink alcohol, did she "party," did she 
go to clubs and the like. To most of Grievant's inquiries she had a standard response: Tm a single 
mother who attends school and works and I don't have time." Ms. Hulbert found Grievant's 
persistent question objectionable. 
Grievant began inviting her to lunch- offers which she consistently declined. In December 
2006 or January 2007, Grievant noticed that she did her homework during lunch and began 
suggesting that he take her out for coffee or that they go to dinner. When she refused, he asked to 
bring lunch back to work for her. Ms. Hulbert told Grievant "no" and added that she wasn't interested 
in going out with him. 
At one point, Grievant told her that he was in the process of "tracking" a woman who was 
cheating on her husband. In January or February 2007, Grievant complained to Ms. Hulbert that his 
leg or foot hurt. He asked her, "Do you want to massage it?" When she said "no," he persisted with 
"Oh, come on." The conversation took place near her cubicle and she began to walk away from him. 
He followed her into the break room. A co-worker, Renee Johnson, then walked into the break room 
and Grievant commented to her, "Oh, she's (indicating Ms. Hulbert) too busy to do anything. She 
works and has a kid and is going to school." Ms. Hulbert foiled her eyes and shook her head at 
Ms. Johnson. 
Ms. Hulbert was particularly offended with Grievant's massage comment. Because she was 
friends with Ms. Gomberg, she discussed the situation with her. They talked about responses she 
could make to discourage Grievant from making similar remarks. Grievant continued to make 
inappropriate comments to Ms. Hulbert. Some of the comments concerned Grievant cheating on his 
wife and then asking other female employees how they felt about his cheating on his wife. These 
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"conversations" often occurred outside his office-next to the women's bathroom or in Ms. Hulbert's 
office. 
By an instant message he sent to Ms. Hulbert, he asked her if she wanted to download some 
music from a CD he had. She didn't respond to his instant message because she had a customer in 
her office at the time. He followed up the instant message, concerned that she hadn't responded and 
asked her if she was mad at him. Ms. Hulbert did not respond to him at that time. Sometime within 
the hour, she went to the bathroom. Grievant tried to engage her by asking whether going out to 
lunch with an old friend who happened to be a woman was wrong. He followed up the unanswered 
question by telling her that he did not want to tell his wife about his lunch plans because he had 
cheated on her in the past. These comments made Ms. Hulbert very uncomfortable. Grievant's 
questions and comments became increasingly more personal in nature. At another point, Grievant 
told Ms. Hulbert about a tattoo that he had. In conjunction with the tattoo, he told her that he had 
been in jail 
Another time, in connection with a work issue, Ms. Hulbert was walking out to a co-worker's 
(Jeff DeJuncker's) car with him to retrieve a picture. Grievant had previously asked her to go to 
lunch, then coffee, then dinner with him. As usual, Ms. Hulbert said "no." When Grievant saw 
Mr. DeJuncker and Ms. Hulbert together, he observed in a flippant manner, "Oh, you'll go to his car 
with him but you wonft go out with me." The comment embarrassed Ms. Hulbert and she felt 
compelled to explain the situation to Mr. DeJuncker. Beginning in early 2007, whenever possible, 
Ms. Hulbert began to ask other people in the office such as Jeff DeJuncker for help with her 
computer problems because she wanted to avoid Grievant. 
To counter Ms. Hulbert's testimony, Grievant testified that he "co&Whave asked Ms. Hulbert 
for a foot massage" but that he did not remember. If he asked her, "it was because he was on 
medication but there was no sexual intent" in his remark. Moreover, as to his other questions of a 
personal nature, he said that he was just making "small talk" by discussing her marital status, her 
child and other topics while he worked on her computer. 
Like Ms. Gomberg, there was no discernable reasons for Ms. Hulbert to lie or exaggerate 
about her experiences with Grievant. Like Ms. Gomberg, Ms. Hulbert was very credible. Her 
testimony had an air of weariness in it when she talked about Grievant* s repeated invitations to 
lunch, coffee and dinner. She became somewhat agitated and uncomfortable when she talked about 
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Grievant's questions-relating to her child's father. It was clear that she did not enjoy describing what 
occurred between herself and Grievant. 
C. Lindsay Nielson 
Ms. Nielson began working as a DWS employment counselor in June 2006. Ms. Nielson 
seemed very self-assured for a young woman and capable of dealing with unpleasant or awkward 
situations. Similar to Ms. Gomberg and Ms. Hulbert, there was no valid reason why she would lie 
or exaggerate. In fact, Ms. Nielson was as credible as the other two witnesses. On the first day of 
work, she met Grievant who shortly thereafter proceeded to "look me up and down" and made it 
obvious that he wanted her to notice that he was ogling her. Within her first week of work, Grievant 
was asking Ms. Nielson if he could drive her car. He persisted in "asking to drive her car on more 
or less a daily basis." Within a four to six week period, he began to ask her to go to lunch with him. 
Ms. Nielson consistently declined his invitations with a short "no." At times, she would respond 
along the lines of, "Oh, yeah, that sounds like a good idea!" or Tm sure my husband would really 
like that!" in a sarcastic manner, indicating that she was married and had no intention of going to 
lunch or anywhere else with Grievant. 
Ms. Nielson testified that she was aware Grievant flirted with other female employees. She 
also was aware that Grievant made other female employees uncomfortable because she had 
conversations with them about it. Ms. Nielson said that Grievant was always trying to flirt with her 
as well, telling her that she resembled a "certain model." She did not consider this to be a 
compliment and these types of remarks made her very uncomfortable. These types of comments and 
to a lesser extent, the lunch invitations continued throughout 2007. She would tell him, "Please don't 
say that" or "That makes me uncomfortable." Grievant would sometimes overtly "ogle" her when 
she was with a customer, but not when other co-workers were near. She began to avoid walking by 
his office whenever possible. At one point, he commented to her that he had been incarcerated. 
In the fall/winter of 2006, Ms. Nielson wore a short "shrug" type sweater over a long white 
shirt. Grievant made fun of the sweater. They were alone in the break room (Ms. Nielson was using 
the microwave) when Grievant poked her in the middle of her back (where the short sweater ended) 
and commented, "It looks like you got this in the Barbie doll section" and "see, it only comes down 
to here." Although Grievant had referred to her clothing as "Barbie doll sized" more than once, she 
was "shocked" that he touched her in this manner. She did not respond becauseshe was embarrassed. 
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She also was afraid that if she aggressively confronted him, he wouldn't fix her computer or would 
take longer than necessary in her office to fix it. Nevertheless, she kept her responses to Grievant's 
continuing inappropriate comments firm and short. 
Ms. Nielson explained that if you objected or weren't "receptive" to Grievant's unwelcomed 
attention, he would later "stall" fixing your computer when a problem arose. For instance, she 
explained, it might take several requests for assistance before Grievant would respond. If she "instant 
messaged" him for help, he would ignore the message. If she went to his office to ask for help, she 
would have to wait several minutes for him to even acknowledge her, Ms. Nielson readily agreed 
that Grievant's response time was slow whenever everyone in the office was experiencing a similar 
technology problem. However, she also recognized that Grievant's slow response or 
non-responsiveness to her occurred after every "awkward conversation " or unpleasant encounter 
with him. Eventually, Ms. Nielson felt so uncomfortable around Grievant that she would attempt to 
fix her computer herself or ask others for assistance before resorting to his help. 
When questioned about the sweater incident, Grievant observed that Ms. Nielson's shrug type 
sweater was not "tight fitting" ("just small"), but admitted making the "Barbie doll" comment. 
Again, he protested, his intent was not sexual in nature. He did not remember poking her in the back, 
but if he did, "the sweater only went to her mid-back." Grievant was adamant: "I never made any 
advances to her other than friendly." He did not deny any other specific allegation that Ms. Nielson 
testified about other than in a general way. 
Ms. Gomberg, Ms. Hulbert and Ms. Nielson all seemed to share a number of characteristics. 
They were all new DWS employees who arrived at the workplace after Grievant was hired. They 
were all relatively young, had pleasant demeanors and were well dressed. They all seemed intelligent 
and well spoken - and finally, they all were very physically attractive. Of particularly importance, 
each consistently made it plain over and over again to Grievant that his attentions were not only 
unwelcome but offensive. 
ACTIONS TAKEN BY MANAGEMENT 
A, James D. Howard 
Mr. Howard is a LAN Administrator at the Agency and has worked 19 years with State 
government. Mr. Howard was Grievant's immediate supervisor in DTS beginning in 2005. 
Mr. Howard testified about drafting or helping to draft various documents relating to Grievanf s 
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performance and conduct (Exs. A-2, A-3; A-4, A-5, A-6). Mr. Howard was aware that Grievant had 
installed a webcam in his office, but did not know that Grievant was "joking about installing this 
item in some of the homes of the female employees." After becoming aware of the "SpyCam," and 
Grievantrs unwelcomed attentions to female employees, Mr. Howard sent an email (Ex. A-6) to 
Chuck Butler in the human resources department on August 18,2006. While he referred his concerns 
about Grievant's "friendliness" with female employees to human resources for them to handle, he 
suggested in the email that Grievant attend the next available sexual harassment training. Because 
Mr. Howard was primarily concerned about conflicts of interest vis-a-vis Grievant's assertions that 
he was doing outside private investigator work, he talked to Grievant about his alleged surveillance 
work. Mr. Howard was satisfied that Grievant was not doing this type of work. He told Grievant to 
take the webcam home however, because there was no legitimate workplace purpose for it. 
Mr. Howard's role in investigating, addressing and finally terminating Grievant for improper conduct 
with female employees seems to have been largely peripheral. 
B. Jim Matsumura 
Mr. Matsumura had been Director of IT Infrastructure at DTS for about two years and prior 
to that, spent eight years as IT Director with DWS. Mr. Matsumura was Grievant's IT manager at 
time he hired Grievant and was aware of his criminal past. Mr. Matsumura drafted a Letter of 
Concern dated September 25,2000 (Ex. A-7). The letter outlined Mr. Matsumura's concerns about 
Grievanfs communication with other DWS employees as follows: MI am referring to 
references ... and conversations you have had that might be construed as intimidating and 
threatening. Jokes, or comments about criminal behavior, and discussions of experiences of explicit 
unlawful conduct can be deemed offensive and/or create an atmosphere of intimidation which is 
inappropriate in the workplace. I suggest strongly that you keep your past experiences with the 
criminal justice system very low key ... This memo constitutes, with the discussion with you, 
Kelly Sharp [Grievanfs supervisor at the time] and I had on 25 September 2000, an understanding 
that any incidents or complaints about the content of your conversations that involve the issues 
discussed above will not be tolerated.. .Any evidence that you have violated this understanding will 
be grounds for termination." 
Mr. Matsumura also was responsible for the CAP dated March 25, 2003 (Ex. A-8) which 
Grievant successfully completed (Ex. A-11). He testified that the CAP addressed performance and 
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behavioral concerns about Grievant in a number of areas. In pertinent part related to Grievantfs 
conduct, Section 4 of the CAP stated the following: 
Proper professional behavior in the workplace with regard to creating a positive work 
environment which means vou must avoid intimidating conversation, behavior, and 
conduct which could lead to violation of Department policies on harassment hostile 
workplace issues. Care and concern about your speech and behavior will enhance the 
professional climate of the work place and instill in others trust and comfort with 
your work efforts. 
1) You are not to discuss your criminal history, encounters with law 
enforcement, and involvement in any criminal behavior with 
individuals at work or in the presence of other staff, DWS employees, 
vendors, clients, or business partners. You are not to have any 
communication with DWS customers or clients who may be in the 
office for business or services. 
You are to arrange with HR to take and complete by the end of month two of your 
corrective action period department training on prevention of unlawful harassment. 
Grievant satisfactorily completed his CAP with both performance and conduct issues including 
sexual harassment training. 
Section 4 of the Completion of Corrective Action letter to Grievant from Mr. Matsumura 
dated October 15,2003, stated: "Proper professional behavior, conduct, and language: This topic we 
have covered at length. I think we agreed that you have been adequately warned about the need to 
leave your past legal issues and behavior in the past. You have been instructed not to discuss your 
past with others in regards your [sic] troubles with the law and criminal behavior. You have 
admitted, though, you did not intend to harm, some individuals could have taken your comments as 
threatening, and intimidating . , . You have completed unlawful harassment training on May 
23rd.. . / ' (Ex. A-11) 
Mr. Matsumura also issued a Letter of Warning dated May 9, 2003 (Ex. A-9) addressing 
Grievantfs time and attendance issues. 
Mr. Matsumura testified that he decided to recommend Grievanf s dismissal based on his 
concerns about Grievantfs improper conduct with female employees. He signed the Intent to Dismiss 
letter dated June 7, 2007 (Ex. A-13). In testifying about the basis for termination, he said that 
Grievantfs unwelcome attentions and references to his criminal past were recurring issues. It was 
JohnM,Duranv. UtahDept of Technology Services 
Case No. 29 CSRB/RO. 433 Page 24 
000277 
evident from the content and tone of his testimony that\Mrr Matsumura had lost patience with 
Grievant. 
C. J. Stephen Fletcher 
Mr. Fletcher is the Executive Director and CIO of DTS. Prior to coming to Utah to work for 
DTS in July 2005, he was CIO for the U.S. Department of Education in Washington, D. C. 
Mr. Fletcher was articulate and well spoken. His testimony reflected his concern for the well being 
of DTS. Mr. Fletcher explained that prior to the creation of DTS, State agencies could contract with 
private sector entities for their technology needs or hire IT personnel as agency employees. 
Mr. Fletcher said that the new State agency was designed to have two functions: (1) partner and 
consult with other State agencies on their technological needs; and (2) provide necessary IT services. 
If an agency decides to reject these services for whatever reason, DTS loses that revenue and may 
then have subsequent problems with the allocation of IT personnel. Because DTS was designed to 
be a service organization, Mr. Fletcher stressed the importance of appropriate and professional 
workplace conduct. If DTS services are declined, the Agency fails to meet the purposes for which 
it was created. 
After meeting with Grievant in a Step 4 pre-termination hearing on July 9,2007, Mr. Fletcher 
made the final decision to terminate Grievant's employment.5 He issued the Final Decision -
Dismissal for Cause letter dated July 10,2007 (Ex. A-14). He testified that Grievant violated DTS 
Code of Conduct policy 1.2.1.2.1.1 (Relationships with Other Employees -Work Relationships) by 
failing to "treat... other employees respectfully and professionally" when he repeatedly pressed his 
coworkers for social engagements (going to lunch or doing things after work). He testified that 
Grievant violated DTS policy 1.2.1.2.1.2 ("Employees shall not harass, stalk, discriminate against, 
or make unwanted advances or sexually suggestive comments to another employee") by making 
sexually suggestive comments like "how many times have you cheated on your boyfriend and how 
5Mr. Fletcher testified that he was troubled by Grievant's inconsistent assertions such as "I didn't 
show the SpyCam to anyone but Jim Howard" and "My performance has always been good - talk to 
Jim Matsumura" during the interview. In fact, Mr. Fletcher talked to Mr. Matsumura who "did not have 
positive feedback on Mr. Duran's workplace performance." Mr, Fletcher also reviewed Grievant's 
performance evaluations as well. On cross examination, Mr. Fletcher made it clear that Grievant was 
terminated on the basis of repeated and unacceptable behavior rather than performance problems and 
that work record evidence of poor performance was an aggravating factor in assessing the discipline 
rather than a basis for termination. 
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many men have you slept with?" Grievant also made sexually suggestive comments about his own 
personal life to female employees. Mr. Fletcher also said that Grievant violated DTS policy by 
making persistent unwanted advances and harassing other employees in asking them to engage in 
social activities when those employees consistently refused. 
Mr. Fletcher observed that Grievant had violated DTS policy 1.2.1.2.1.3 ("Employees shall 
use non-abusive, respectful, and decent language.. ..") with one employee in particular when he 
"ogled" her and made repeated inappropriate comments about her clothing. He continued testifying 
that this language was offensive and treated the employee like a sexual object. By violating DTS 
policy 1.2.13.2.4 ("Employees shall not engage in unprofessional conduct... that compromises 
the ability of the employee or agency to fulfill its professional responsibilities"), Mr. Fletcher 
was particularly emphatic that Grievant's conduct created an environment where several "DWS 
employees were so uncomfortable that they went out of their way to avoid him." This made it very 
difficult for DTS to provide the services that it was supposed to deliver as a customer service 
organization. 
Mr. Fletcher also testified that in addition to violating DTS policies, Grievanfchad violated 
DHRM applicable rules cited in the Final Decision. R477-9(l)(a)(ii) (Standards of Conduct) "An 
employee shall: ...maintain an acceptable level of performance and conduct on all other verbal and 
written job expectations " Mr. Fletcher testified that Grievant had not complied with this policy 
due to a lack of professional relationships with DTS customers (i.e. DWS female co-workers) who 
felt threatened and intimidated by his conduct In addition, Grievant also violated R477-1 l-l(l)(a) 
(noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, including but not limited to 
... agency professional standards and workplace policies) and R477-ll-l(l)(e) (misfeasance, 
malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the public service) by his conduct 
because he made it difficult for DTS to provide an acceptable level of service. 
Mr. Fletcher concluded his testimony by stating that he had carefully considered the 
discretionary factors under R477-11-3 in deciding to terminate Grievant's employment rather than 
imposing a less severe penalty (such as suspension). He believed Grievant had ample prior notice 
of his unacceptable behavior including but not limited to talking about his criminal background. He 
observed that Grievant understood applicable rules and workplace standards. For instance, he said 
that while Grievant fully understood - or should have understood - that he was not to comment on 
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his criminal history, he failed.to comply with this admonition. Mr: Fletcher considered the repeated 
nature of Grievanf s conduct, his prior disciplinary and corrective actions, as well as previous oral 
warnings, written warnings and discussions. He thought that Grievanfs conduct was indicative of 
a long-term pattern of unacceptable social interactions and unwanted advances. 
Mr. Fletcher testified that he was particularly concerned about the negative effects of 
Grievant's actions on the Agency's operations and considered the problem severe. If clients avoid 
using DTS personnel, the Agency was not meeting its mission. The potential of damage to the 
organization was troublesome to him because, he asserted, DTS could be held liable for Grievant's 
misconduct. Finally, in addressing how DTS had treated other similarly situated employees, 
Mr. Fletcher observed that the only other terminations (two of them) had been for performance issues 
and viewing pornography in the workplace, so that there were no comparable cases. 
On cross examination, Mr. Fletcher was resolute that Grievant was terminated on the basis 
of improper conduct rather than sexual harassment as that term is legally construed. He reiterated 
that Grievant had been repeatedly instructed not to engage in attempts to engage in social interactions 
where co-workers had consistently declined his invitations and-requests. He .said. that Grievant's 
"mannerisms" were offensive and clearly unwelcome. Mr. Fletcher observed that Grievant's 
behavior, whether it constituted sexual harassment or not, was such that it created a hostile, 
intimidating environment for his female co-workers. 
GRIEVANT'S AWARENESS OF APPLICABLE POLICIES AND RULES 
Grievant's attorney argued that it was fundamentally unfair and violated Grievant's due 
process rights to terminate his employment for violating policies and rules of which he had little or 
no knowledge. Although Grievant did not testify that he was specifically unaware of the DHRM 
rules cited in the Intent to Dismiss, he said that while he may have opened the email from 
William Shiflett dated June 30, 2006, he did not remember opening and reading the attachment 
containing new DTS policies and procedures. (Ex. A-21) The email subject line of Mr. Shiflett's 
communication read "DTS Policies" and outlined in pertinent part, "Attached is a copy of all internal 
policies for the Department of Technology Services. I encourage each of you to take this opportunity 
to review the policies and spend a few minutes discussing them with your supervisor. Please also 
review... which have received some minor changes. " A log accompanying the email in Exhibit 
A-21 indicates that Grievant both received and opened the email the same day it was sent at 
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10:23 a.m. If, in fact; Grievant did not take the opportunity to review these policies, it was willful 
disregard on his part. 
A recent CSRB Step 6 Decision has addressed the issue of employee awareness of policies 
and procedures: Dian Castagno v. Utah Department of Human Services, Case No 9 CSRB 8 (2006). 
In that case, one of the issues was whether the grievant had knowledge of certain agency rules and 
regulations when she was dismissed for violating the same. The CSRB Board held as follows: 
After carefully considering the parties* arguments on appeal... the Board agrees that 
the Hearing Officer erred by requiring the Department prove as a perquisite to 
termination... that the [employee] actually knew and fully understand her conduct 
violated Department policy. The Board believes that such a standard would place an 
inappropriate and unnecessary burden on departments in disciplinary actions based 
on policy violations. 
Indeed, such an evidentiary standard would effectively require departments to prove 
not only that training was provided and that department policy was readily accessible 
to employees, but also that the employee actually knew and fully understood how the 
policy applied in every situation. Employees would be able to avoid justified 
disciplinary action based on policy violation simply by claiming ignorance or lack of 
knowledge of the relevant policy... 
[The] Board holds that when disciplining an employee for violations of its policies 
and procedures, it is sufficient when a department notifies its employees through 
training or disbursement that it has policies employees are expected to comply with 
and that violation of those policies may result in disciplinary action. To require more 
than this would place an unmanageable burden on a department... and would also 
create an evidentiary standard that simply could not be proven with any degree of 
certainty in any evidentiary hearing reviewing a department's disciplinary action. 
Castagno at page 13. 
Mr. Fletcher testified that his understanding was that all State employees were made aware 
of DHRM rules and policies at their time of hire and from time to time thereafter. In accordance with 
Mr. Fletchers testimony, even assuming that Grievant was unaware of DTS and DHRM rules and 
policies governing his conduct, he was counseled, trained, and instructed verbally and in writing that 
certain behaviors for which he was terminated were unacceptable. Grievant clearly should have 
known better. 
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GRIEVANT'S DEFENSE 
In addition to his own testimony, Grievant called three witnesses to testify on his behalf The 
first was Melissa Youngman. Ms. Youngman was a DWS employment counselor at the Woods 
Cross office for approximately 2-1/2 years. She worked with Grievant. Ms. Youngman was a pleasant 
looking, well groomed, tall, large woman. She testified that she "saw Grievant on a daily basis and 
never had an occasion where [her] computer wasn't fixed on a timely basis." She said that Grievant 
had asked her if he could drive her car, but she took his request as a joke and was not offended or 
uncomfortable. Ms. Youngman did not indicate if Grievant had asked her to drive her car more than 
once, however. She said that she had never had a "sexual dialogue" with Grievant and could not 
recall hearing any sexually oriented conversations he had with others. When asked, "Based on 
[Grievant's] actions in the workplace, was there a general sense of fear?" she responded "no." 
However, there was a long hesitation before she answered the question. She then added, "Not so 
much fear, maybe intimidation, 1 guess." 
Ms. Youngman clarified that Grievant had "strong opinions about religion, abortion, and 
politics," but said she personally did not engage in these discussions. When discussions related to 
these topics became heated, Ms. Youngman would leave. 
In stark contrast to Ms. Gomberg, Ms. Hulbert and Ms. Nielson, Grievant never asked 
Ms. Youngman to go to lunch, or dinner, or for coffee with him. She said that there were monthly 
group lunches and employees, including Grievant, would take turns picking up the food. Not 
surprisingly, she saw nothing "unprofessional" about these lunches. Ms. Youngman testified that 
Grievant never said anything to her that made her feel intimidated and had never observed Grievant 
sexually harassing anyone. She became aware of the webcam in Grievant's office shortly after he 
installed it. While not feeling intimidated by it, she readily acknowledged that "it was out of the 
norm" and that she didn't understand why he had the camera set up at work." Ms. Youngman left the 
Woods Cross office in October 2006 for a position with the Department of Education. 
Ms. Youngman's testimony was illustrative of several key factors. First, apparently Grievant 
was selective about whom he asked to lunch (or coffee or dinner) whether on a repeated basis or not. 
Second, Grievant also was selective about whom he repeatedly asked to drive their cars. Third, 
apparently Grievant was available to provide technological assistance on a timely basis to some 
employees, but not others. Those others seem to be those who found his conduct objectionable. 
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Finally, just because Grievant did not make comments of a personal nature to Ms. Youngman or ask 
her inappropriate questions, it does not mean that his treatment of all female co-workers was similar. 
Grievant's second witness was Stephanie Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales). Ms. Gonzales was a 
27-1/2 year State employee veteran. She worked at the Woods Cross office as an office technician 
for six or seven years before leaving in June 2007 to work at the Mid vale Employment Center. As 
an office technician, Ms. Gonzales worked at the front counter doing indexing, scanning and the like. 
She testified that Grievant "worked on her computer more than once." She said that she never had 
a conversation with him that was sexual in nature or made her fearful, uncomfortable or feel 
intimidated. Like Ms. Youngman, Ms. Gonzales never witnessed Grievant engaging in improper or 
offensive conduct ("I never saw him hitting on anyone1'). Ms. Gonzales, an assertive woman of some 
stature who said she was 57-year-old, clearly liked Grievant. She said that she and Grievant 
sometimes went for coffee together or would pick up coffee for each other. Whenever she was 
specifically asked about Grievanf s alleged misconduct with other co-workers, her testimony became 
guarded. Otherwise, she made eye contact and exchanged smiles with Grievant during the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing. 
Ms. Gonzales wryly described Grievant as "friendly and outspoken - he gets along with 
everybody just like me." Ms. Gonzales proceeded to clarify her remarks; "I didn't think he had 
personality issues, maybe rough around the edges. People get offended sometimes when I say 
something but I don't intend it." Of particular interest was the notably long pause after she was 
asked, "Was there a general atmosphere of being uncomfortable around him?" She finally 
responded, "I don't know how to answer that. Not that anyone confided in me about." Clearly 
Ms. Gonzales did not want to say anything negative about her friend. In response to the follow-up 
inquiry, "Did you ever hear that he was creating problems?" she reluctantly admitted, "I may have 
sensed that he was." 
Grievant clearly enjoyed a positive relationship with Ms. Gonzales, somewhat akin to the 
relationship that he had with Ms. Youngman. Like Ms. Youngman, Ms. Gonzales also realized that 
there were problems with Grievanfs behavior, but was reluctant to admit it. Finally Just as was the 
case with Ms. Youngman, the fact that Grievant did not subject Ms. Gonzales to inappropriate 
conduct does not mean that he treated other female employees the way he treated her. 
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Grievant's third witness was a male. Jeff DeJuncker, a soft spoken and mild mannered young 
man who was a DWS Eligibility Specialist, had worked at the Woods Cross office for several years 
with Grievant. Mr. DeJuncker was nervous and struggled with his testimony. His body language was 
tight and his hands clenched while he spoke. His responses were tentative and his manner hesitating, 
indicating that he clearly would have preferred to be elsewhere. He testified Grievant had worked 
on his computer and on occasion was slow in providing assistance. Mr. DeJuncker attributed the 
slow response to Grievant being busy with other tasks. When asked if Grievant made him 
uncomfortable or intimidated him, Mr. DeJuncker said that he may have been uncomfortable on 
some occasions, but not intimidated. He described himself as "easy going and not easily offended; 
I know how people are." In describing Grievant, he observed, "His composure - he's kinda 
overbearing. A personality flaw. Quirky at times and somewhat unconventional. He could be funny." 
Mr. DeJuncker continued, "Other people may take him differently." 
Like Ms. Youngman and Ms. Gonzales, Mr. DeJuncker never saw or heard Grievant 
sexually harassing anyone or making sexual jokes or innuendoes. He also admitted — albeit 
reluctantly - that other people in the office had asked him for computer assistance several^times 
because they did not want to ask Grievant. He confirmed Ms. Hulberfs testimony that Grievant had 
commented to her, "So, you'll go out with him but not with me?" when Grievant saw Mr. DeJuncker 
and Ms. Hulbert on their way to Mr. DeJuncker's car. 
The only time that Mr. DeJuncker (and another male co-worker) went to lunch with Grievant, 
Grievant made a comment in passing. Mr. DeJuncker said the comment made him a "little 
uncomfortable," although "it wasnft a big or huge deal." On direct, he said that Grievant had asked 
him and the other co-worker "who the cutest girl in the office was." Neither Mr. DeJuncker nor the 
other coworker replied and proceeded to change the subject. On cross examination, Mr. DeJuncker 
hesitantly reluctantly admitted that in connection with the "cutest girl in the office" comment, 
Grievant had also said something along the lines of "I like girls with big butts." When pressed, 
Mr. DeJuncker said that he did not remember the exact language Grievant used, and so he might be 
"paraphrasing." Finally, Mr. DeJuncker vaguely recalled that Grievant mentioned that he had been 
in jail and had said something about a fight and martial arts. That conversation took place in the 
break room during lunch and Mr. DeJuncker did not follow up with questions. He could not 
remember if other employees were present 
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The most obvious difference between Mr. DeJuncker and the three other DWS employees 
who found Grievanfs conduct offensive is, of course, gender. Grievant seems to have confined his 
objectionable behavior to young, attractive female employees. The fact that Mr. DeJuncker seemed 
largely unaware of Grievant's inappropriate conduct with these three employees does not mean that 
it did not occur. 
Grievant1 s testimony relating to his employment history was often disjointed and unclear. For 
instance, he said he "didn't agree with the CAP and had filed an appeal - or grievance about it" 
Although performance was not at issue, he testified that a lot of his performance problems (e.g., 
sleeping on the job, attendance issues, etc.) were due to physical problems and illness. He did not 
appeal his 2004 and 2006 disciplinary actions on that basis, however, and there was no other 
evidence in the record other than Grievant's self-serving testimony about his alleged medical 
impairments. Even though he said that he could not recall asking Ms. Huibert for a foot massage, 
he testified that //he did, it was because he had some sort of foot injury or condition. Interestingly, 
Grievant did not ask co-workers who were more favorably disposed to him, like Ms. Youngman, 
Ms Gonzales or Mr. DeJuncker, for a massage. 
Grievant believed that he was being terminated for sexual harassment based on the content 
in the Intent to Dismiss letter. He did not think he had sexually harassed anyone by asking them to 
go to lunch or coffee with him or asking them to drive their cars. Unbelievably, he said that when 
an employee said "no" to his advances, he did not think that "no11 meant "no, not forever" but rather, 
"no this time but maybe another time." It is difficult to believe that Grievant did not learn that "no 
means no" in the sexual harassment training sessions he attended. Most of his testimony was 
self-serving at best. Very little of it, if any, seemed credible. He attributed some of his workplace 
issues to "personality clashes." It frequently seemed to be a supervisor's or co-worker's fault that 
they misunderstood his intentions. Grievant's demeanor was insincere when he appeared to be 
puzzled about his impact on some female employees as he minimized his behavior, "I just talk too 
much. I thought I had a better rapport with some of them than I apparently had." 
Grievant testified that he learned what sexual harassment was by attending sexual harassment 
training - more than once: "you can't tell nasty jokes or use offensive language (swearing) or make 
comments about women's sizes related to pregnancy or say they are fat. You can't give a person a 
compliment like you look nice today." It is nothing short of astounding that while Grievant knew that 
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workplace comments related to a woman's size are inappropriate, ke nevertheless made repeated 
references to Ms. Nielsen's petite stature in a demeaning and sexualized fashion and told 
Ms. Gomberg that he "liked girls with a little meat on them." He testified that ifhc told Ms. Nielson 
that she looked like a model (again, he could not recall making those comments), he meant it as a 
compliment and perhaps he had just been "too friendly." Grievant ^aid that he had asked to drive 
other employee's cars simply because he liked cars. Apparently, Grievant only liked some of his 
co-worker's cars, though, because he did not ask everyone. 
Finally, Grievant denied ignoring requests for computer assistance or being slow to respond 
other than for justified workplace demands stating, "I treated everyone the same." This testimony, 
however, was closely followed by his comment, "I favored some by offering them access to music 
but it just wasn't women." He concluded his testimony on direct stating: "I was trying to buy 
friendship with food and doughnuts. I don't know how to communicate with other people. I asked 
for sensitivity training. They are taking me wrong. Whatever I need to do to change, Til do it." 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OR INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT? 
Grievant and his attorney argued that there were insufficient grounds to terminate Grievaxxfs 
employment for sexual harassment. The Agency countered that Grievant was not terminated for 
sexual harassment per se but rather, for unacceptable and inappropriate conduct. It is unnecessary 
to determine in this case whether Grievanfs actions rose to the level of sexual harassment. Grievant 
was not charged with sexual harassment and clearly, was not terminated on that basis. However, just 
as there lies a medium ground between sexual harassment as that term has been defined and 
developed through statutes, regulations, rules and case law and acceptable workplace banter, there 
is a medium ground between acceptable workplace banter and offensive, objectionable or 
inappropriate conduct. The latter is often, but not always, a matter of degree. As Mr. Fletcher 
testified, asking a co-worker to lunch is not in and of itself harassment. "It's the pressing, the 
repetition of asking after the co-worker has made it clear that she is not interested." There is ample 
evidence that Grievant was relentless in his inappropriate pursuit of workplace "friendship." The 
location of his office next to the women's restroom made it easy for |iim to engage in unwelcome 
conversations with female employees on a regular basis. 
Despite his protestations that he was just being friendly and talked too much, Grievanfs 
behavior created a hostile, intimidating and offensive working environment, at least for the three 
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targeted female employees. Whether he intended to create such an environment is irrelevant. 
Grievant insisted on talking about his criminal history despite the fact that he had been instructed 
more than once to refrain. He had been warned, verbally and in writing., that he could be subject to 
discipline, including termination, for continuing to do so. While his intentions may have been 
different, it is not difficult to see how a co-worker, particularly a young woman new to the 
workplace, would feel intimidated by such comments. In addition, even if Grievant had not been 
previously instructed to avoid frequent, personal and inappropriate interactions with coworkers, he 
should have realized his conduct was offensive and inappropriate because each of the three female 
employees plainly told him so - over and over and over. 
As made evident by his own testimony, Grievant simply did not want accept "no" for an 
answer, hi light of the numerous chances he was given to improve, it appears that Grievant was 
simply incapable of conforming his behavior to normal, acceptable standards. Within a few weeks 
of Ms. Gomberg sending Grievant an email telling him that she did not want him to make comments 
relating to objectionable topics (such as "other women whom you find attractive"), Grievant was in 
her office, talking about his alleged sexual relations with married, female co-workers,- while he 
worked on her computer. 
Moreover, his conduct, whether he intended it or not, also had the effect of unreasonably 
interfering with employees' work performance and impacted and had the potential of impacting the 
well being of the Agency. Mr. Fletcher's testimony on this issue was clear and convincing. Both 
Ms. Gomberg and Ms. Nielson testified that after a time, they wanted to avoid Grievant to the point 
where they sought computer assistance elsewhere (e.g., from Mr. DeJuncker) or attempted to fix 
problems on their own. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances and the substantial evidence that was presented 
at the Step 5 hearing, this Hearing Officer finds that Grievant's dismissal was reasonable in light of 
the charges. The Agency exercised its discretion to decide upon the discipline and the discipline, 
particularly in light of previous discipline as well as corrective action and other notices and warnings 
about the same or similar type of inappropriate workplace conduct, is not excessive, disproportionate 
or an abuse of discretion-
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DECISION 
I find there is substantial evidence that Grievant violated Agbncy policies referenced in the 
charges in the Intent to Dismiss and Final Decision and uphold the Agency's decision to terminate 
Grievant's employment. For this, and the other foregoing reasons, <j(nevantf s appeal is denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of May 2008. 
Katherine A. Fox 
CSRB Hearing/Presiding Officer 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l~21(12)(b). 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board 
within ten working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
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D T S POLICY 2Q0(M)Q01 
Code of Conduct 
Status: Active Policy 
Effective Date: June 8,2006 through June 30,2008 
Revised Date: N/A 
Approved By: J. Stephen Ftetcher, CiO 
Authority: Utah Admin. Code R477-10; ifiah Admin. Code R-477-11; Utah 
Admin. Code R477-14; DTS POLICY2000-0002 Employee 
Relations; DTS POLICY 2000-0005 Dismissal vf Schedule A 
Employees 
A A Purpose 
This policy is to promote a working environment that ensures employee ethicat and 
professional conduct and brings out the full potential of each employee. 
1.1.1 Background 
The success of the Department of Technology Services (DTS) is dependant upon 
the trust, credibility, and confidence earned from employees, clients, and 
stakeholders. This trust and credibility is obtained by adhering to commitments, 
displaying honesty -and integrity* and reaching Department goals through honorable 
conduct 
This Code of Conduct applies to.all work-related activities of Depanmem 
employees. Employees are expected to conform to this Code and relevant 
professional standards and to comply with all applicable laws, rules, and policies. 
Conduct that violates approved professional standards or other laws may be 
unethical and subject to employee discipline, even if It is not specifically listed in this 
policy. By complying with this policy, employees protect their integrity and reputation 
as well as that of the State of Utah, the Department, the Departments clients, and 
their associates. 
1.1.2 Scope 






H is the policy of DTS that all employees of the Department adhere to the following 
standards. 
1*2.1 Standards 
1.2.1.1 Fostering Good Client Relations 
1.2.1.1.1 Relationships with Clients and Vendors 
12.1.1.1.1 Employees shall avoid relationships or commitments that would 
knowingly be detrimental to the interests of the State. 
1.2.1.1.1.2 Employees shall not use their positions* or information acquired 
through their positions, to coerce or otherwise influence clients 
or vendors to provide favors for themselves or others. 
1.2.1.1.2 Managing Records and Information 
1.2.1.1.2.1 Employees shall respect and protect the confidentiality and 
privacy of records and information, and shall not use 
information contained in a private, controlled, or protected 
record for personal purposes. 
1.2.1-1.2.2 Employees shall not tape or record any activities except as 
permitted by law or policy and approved by DTS management. 
12.1.1.2.3 Employees shall not knowingly violate any State or federal laws 
(including the Government Records Access and Management 
Act (GRAMA)) that specify when and how clients, other 
agencies, and the pubSc may inspect or copy the Department's 
records, including client records. 
1.21.12.4 Employees shall not falsity or wrongfully destroy any record, 
report, or claim, or knowingly enter, or cause to be entered, any 
false or improper information m Department records. 
1.2.12 Relationships with Other Employees 
1.2.12.1 Work Relationships 
12.12.1.1 Employees shall treat their fellow employees respectfully and 
professionally. 
12.12.12 Employees shall not harass, stalk, discriminate against, or make 
unwanted advances or sexually suggestive comments to 
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another employee. 
1.2.1.2.1.3 Employees shall use non-abusive, respectful, and decent 
language (this prohibits any profanity or vulgar language or 
activity that is demeaning, belittling, or knowingly offensive io 
other employees). 
1.2.1.2.1 A Employees shall respect Ihe religious values and cultural 
differences of their colleagues. 
1.2.1.2.1.5 Employees shall not be insubordinate or disloyal to appropriate 
orders of a manager or supervisor. An empfoyee may seek 
assistance from ihe HR Director if the employee befteves they 
have received an inappropriate order. 
1.2.1.2 1.6 Employees shall avoid slanderous or malicious gossip. 
1.2.1.2.2 Supervisory Relationships 
1.2.1.22,1 Supervisors or other administrators shall treat subordinates with 
respect and dignity. 
12 1.2.2.2 Supervisors or other administrator^ shall create an open and 
supportive environment where employees feel comfortable 
raising issues and questions consistent with DTS employee 
relations policy. 
1.2.1.2.2.3 Supervisors or other administrators shall encourage and 
facSitate the professional development of employees \n fulfilling 
their job tittles within available resources, 
1,2 A 22 A Supervisors or other administrators shall not exploit other 
employees for personal favors or gain, 
12.1.2.2.5 Supervisors or other administrators shall not use their position 
of authority to harass, stalk, discriminate against, or become 
involved in sexual relationships with another employee. 
1.2.1.22.6 Supervisors or other administrators shall report instances of 
questionable or unethical behavior to ihe DTS HR Office. 
1X1.3 Personal Work Ethics 
1.2,1.3.1 Laws, RuFes, and Regulations 
Employees will obey applicable civil or criminal taws, regulations, rules, or poiicy 
governing their work or professionat activities. 
DURAN PRO 010C 
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1-2,1.3.2 Professional Competence 
1.2.1.3.2.1 Employees shall truthfully represent to ihek employer, clients, 
and prospective clients their professional credentials and 
licensure, education, training, and experience. 
1.2.1.3.2.2 Employees shall report through appropriate channels any 
known or suspected treatment toward employes or clients that 
is unlawful or against policy, such as abuse, discrimination, 
stalking, or harassment. 
1.2.1.3.2.3 Employees shall support a work environment that is safe from 
all forms of violence, Including domestic VIOIBT)^ perpetrated 
within the workplace. 
1,2.1.32A Employees shall not engage In unprofessional conduct on or off 
the job that compromises the ability of the employee or agency 
to fulfill professional responsibilities. 
1.2.1 -3.2.5 Employees shall not cause damage to public property or waste 
public resources, supplies, or funds, or use public property for 
personal or private advantage in violation of the Acceptable Use 
of Information Technology Resources Policy through negligence 
or willful misconduct. 
1 2 A .3.2.8 Employees shall not use State resources for personal gain. 
1.2.1.3.3 Performance of Duties 
Employees shall perform their assigned duties doting ti\e full 
schedule for which \hey are befog compensated. 
Employees shall not engage in any activity that could be 
considered a dereHctton of duty, tndudfog, but not limited to, 
absence without leave, &buse of teave, neglect of simdard 
performance, willful delays or neglect to perform assigned 
dalles and responsibilities, inattention to duty, or leaving their 
work area unattended or inappropriately attended. 
Employees shall not participate in, condone,, conceal, or be 
associated with dishonesty, fr^ud, misrepresentation, or theft. 
Employees shall no! consume or use alcohol or illegal 
substances, or be under the influence of alcohol or illegal 
substances, while on compensated work time, while on-caH, on 
State property, or while operating any vehicle while on duly. 








defined In Utah Code § 58-37-2(1), that impairs the employee's 
ability to safely perform h?s or her duties during compensated 
work time, while on-calL on State property or while operating a 
State vehicle. An employee desiring an exception to this policy 
shall submit a written request for approval to his or her 
immediate supervisor with an explanation as to how the duties 
may be temporarily changed or limited to ensure the employees 
safety and the safety of others. 
1.2.1.3.3.6 Employees shall not unlawfully manufacture, dispense, 
possess, or distribute any controlled substance or alcohol 
during working hours, on State property, or while operating any 
vehicles while on duty. 
1.2.1.3.3.7 Employees shall not solicit unauthorized contributions nor 
distribute unauthorized materials during work hours. 
1.3 Procedures 
1.3.1 Reporting Violations 
Employees shall immediately report suspected violations of this Code through their 
immediate Supervisor. If for any reason that is not possible, the report should be 
directed to the Office of Human Resources or the Executive Director. 
1.3.2 Violations of Code 
Depending on the circumstances, the violation, and the degree of the employee's 
culpability, the Department may take one or more of the following agency actions, 
consistent with Human Resource Management Rule R477-10 and/or 11: 
• Corrective Action 
• Disciplinary Action (which may include dismissal) 
• Referral of the Matter to Law Enforcement, or the Of5ce of the Attorney 
General, for Possible Legal Action (including criminal prosecution) 
• Termination of Employment 
Department administrators shall consult with the Office of Human Resources 
regarding the most appropriate action to take in response to an employee's violation 
of this Code. When a violation results in an employee corrective or disciplinary 
action, the employee's Supervisor shall place documentation of the violation, and 
the resulting action, in the employee's official personnel f3e, consistent with Human 
Resource Management Rules. 
if an employee's violation of this Code results in either personal gain to that 
employee, or personal harm or loss to a client the State, or another employee, 
disciplinary action is generally warranted. If the employee's Supervisor decides not 
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to take disciplinary action, the Supervisor shall document the violation, the gravity of 
the violation, and the extent of the resulting gain or losses, and the reasons why 
disciplinary action was not warranted in the particular situation. 
Employees who are subject to a law suit resulting from violations of \h\s poficy or 
other acts that are illegal or.out of the scope of State employment duties may not be 
indemnified under the Governmental Immunity Act 
1*4 Related Documents 
• Utah Code §58-37-2(1} 
Document History 
Originator. Larene Wyss, DTS-HR 
Next Review: May 15,2006 
Reviewed Date: N/A 
Reviewed By: N/A 
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R477- 9 Employee Conduct 
R477-9, Employee Conduct. 
9-1„ Standards of Conduct. 
An employee shall comply with the standards of conduct established in these rules and the policies 
and rules established by agency management. 
(1) Employees shall apply themselves to and shall fulfill their assigned duties during the full-time 
for which they are compensated, 
(a) An employee shall: 
(i) comply with the standards established in the individual performance plans; 
(u) maintain an acceptable level of performance and conduct on an other 
verbal and written job expectations; I 
(ill) report conditions and circumstances, including controlled substances or 
alcohot impairment, that may prevent the employee from performing their 
job effectively and safely; 
(iv) Inform the supervisor of any unclear instructions or procedures, 
(2) An employee shall make prudent and frugal use of state funds, equipment, buildings, and 
supplies. 
(3) An employee who reports for duty or attempts to perform the duties of the position while 
under the influence of alcohol or nonprescribed controlled substances shall be subject to 
conective action or discipline in accordance with R477-10-2, R477-11 and R477-14. 
(a) The agency may decline to defend and indemnify an employee found violating this 
rule, in accordance with Section 63-30-36 (c}(») of thp Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
(4) An employee shall not drive a state vehicle, or any other vehicle, on state time while under 
the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. 
(a) An employee who violates this rule shall be subject to corrective action or discipline 
pursuant to R477-10-2, R477-11 and R477-14. 
(b) The agency may decline to defend or indemnify an employee who violates this rule, 
according to Section 63~30-36(3)(c)(i) of the Utah Governmental immunity Act. 
9*2. Outside Employment. 
(1} State employment shall be the principal vocation for a full-time employee governed by these rules. 
An employee may engage in outside employment under the following conditions: 





11*1. Disciplinary Action. 
{1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following causes or 
reasons: 
(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, including but 
not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards, standards of conduct 
and workplace policies; 
(b) work performance that is inefficient or incompetent; 
(c) failure to maintain skills and adequate performance levels; 
(d) insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a superior; 
(e) misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the 
public service; 
(f) any incident involving intimidation, physical harm, or threats of physical harm 
against co-workers, management, or ihe public; 
(g) no longer meets the requirements of the position. 
(2) All disciplinary actions of career service employees shall be governed by principles of due 
process and Title 67, Chapter 19a. The disciplinary process shall include all of the following, 
except as provided under Subsection 67-19-18(4): 
(a) The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of the proposed 
discipline and the underlying reasons supporting the intended action. 
(b) The employee's reply must be received within five working days m order to have the 
. agency representative consider the reply before discipline is imposed. 
(c) If an employee waives the aght to respond or does not reply within the time frame 
established by the agency representative or m^hm five days, whichever is longer, 
discipline may be imposed in accordance with these rules. 
(3) After a career service employee has been informed of the reasons for ihe proposed 
discipline and has been given an opportunity to respond and be responded to, the agency 
representative may discipline that employee, or any career service exempt employee not 
subject to the same procedural rights, by imposing one or more of the following: 
(a) written reprimand; 
(b) suspension without pay up to 30 calendar days per incident requiring discipline; 
(c) demotion of any employee through one of the following methods: 
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(c) The employee shall have an opportunity to be heara oy me agency head or 
designee The heanng before the department head or designee shall be strictly 
limited to the specific reasons raised rn the notice of intent to demote or dismiss 
(i) At the heanng the employee may present, either in person, in wntmg, or 
with a representative, comments or reasons as to why the proposed 
disciplinary action should not be taken The agency head or designee is 
not required to receive or allow other witnesses on behalf of the employee 
(H) The employee may present documents, affidavits or other wntten materials 
at the hearing However, the employee is not entitled to present or discover 
documents wrfhln the possession or control of the department or agency 
that are private, protected or controlled under Chapter 63-2, the 
Governmental Access and Records Management Act 
(d) Following the heanng, the employee may be dismissed or demoted if the agency 
head finds adequate cause or reason 
(e) The employee shall be notified in wntmg of the agency head's decision Specific 
reasons shall be provided if the decision is a demotion or dismissal 
(3) Agency management may place an employee on paid administrative leave pending the 
administrative appeal to the agency head 
11-3 Discretionary Factors. 
(1) When deciding the specific type and seventy of discipline, the agency head or representative 
may consider the following factors 
(a) consistent application of rules and standards, 
(b) prior knowledge of rules and standards, 
(c) the severity of the infraction, 
(d) the repeated nature of violations; 
(e) prior disciplinary/corrective actions, 
(f) previous oral warnings, wntten warnings and discussions, 
(g) the employee's past work record, 
(h) the effect on agency operations, 
{i) the potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
KEY: discipline of employees, dismissal of employees, grievances, government hearings 
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment 2006 
Notice of Continuation June 11,2002 
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